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Current U.S. arms sales to Iran were investigated against
the background of charges that the sales were "out of control,"
and that the U.S. was becoming a modern-day "merchant of death"
in the Persian Gulf. Iran's arms requirements were analyzed
in the light of Iran's perceptions of local and regional
threats, her desire for area stability, and her need to pro-
tect her oil resources and shipping lanes.
Rationales for U.S. supply of arms to Iran were also
examined, including the mutuality of national interests, the
high U.S. dependency on Persian Gulf oil, and the benefits of
arms sales to U.S. defense industries. Major implications of
the arms sales are the dependency of Iran's armed forces on
U.S. support, and the unwritten commitment of the U.S. to
supply that support for the next decade.
Iran and the United States will reduce their strong inter-
dependency in the furure, as the U.S. adopts a more restrictive
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Since Fiscal Year 1972, U. S. arms sales to the govern-
ment of Iran have totaled a staggering $10.4 billion through
July, 1976. In annual figures, these sales have shown an
almost seven-fold increase from $524-million in Fiscal Year
1972 to $3.9-billion in Fiscal Year 1974. 1
Although the annual rate dropped somewhat to $2.6-billion
in Fiscal Year 1975 and was estimated to be $1.3-billion in
2 . .Fiscal Year 1976, it was expected that U. S. sales of military
hardware and support services to Iran would continue to be
3
at or near the $2-billion-per-year level into the 1980 's.
The pace may have slackened, but the level of sales will
remain high. Recently these arms sales to Iran have been
4described in the U. S. Congress as "out of control." Not
only have the sales to Iran increased sharply in dollar value,
but also they have become all-encompassing in nature.
Consider some of the recent U. S. deliveries and sales
contracts: 80 F-14 fighter aircraft equipped with the most
U. S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations,
United States Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf
, p. 5, U. S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. , 1976.
2
U. S. Congress, U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
U. S. Military Sales to Iran
, p. VIII, U.S. G.P.O., 1976.
3
"Secretary Kissinger Attends Session of U.S. -Iran Joint
Commission," Department of State Bulletin , 6 Sep 76, p. 310.
4
U. S. Senate, U. S. Military Sales to Iran, p. XIII.
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modern air-to-air missile system - the Phoenix (100+nm range)
;
four Spruance-class modern, multi-purpose destroyers which
will be better equipped and armed than the U. S. models; 300
F-16's the U. S. Air Force's latest fighter/bomber; and 250
F-18L's, the land-based version of the U. S. Navy's newest
fighter design.
The list goes on almost endlessly: 209 F-4 fighter/bombers,
12 RF-4's - the reconnaissance version, 170 F-5 fighters, six
P-3 patrol planes, 56 C-130 cargo aircraft, 13 KC-707 tanker
aircraft, and 12 Boeing 747 transport aircraft.
Other purchases and orders include U. S. M-60 tanks, the
improved Hawk surface-to-air missile system, M-113 armored
personnel carriers, 155mm and 175mm self-profelled guns, TOW
and Dragon anti-tank missiles, advanced attack, transport,
and minesweeping helicopters, and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
With this huge influx of military hardware has come a
corresponding increase in the number of U. S. military and
civilian personnel in Iran to help manage the deliveries,
provide and oversee the training program, aid assist in the
maintenance of these new and very sophisticated weapons.
The number of U. S. personnel in Iran has grown from
approximately fifteen to sixteen-thousand in 1972 to twenty-
four-thousand in 1976. It could easily reach fifty-thousand
or higher by 1980.







It must be re-emphasized that these arms contracts and
deliveries have been cash sales; not grants, aid, or loans.
The Iranians generally have paid top-dollar prices in cash
for the latest weapons systems they desired. Even so, there
has arisen a host of questions about various facets of the
recent large-scale military sales by the U. S. to Iran.
Some of the more commonly-asked questions are listed
here. Is the U. S. promoting stability in the Persian Gulf
or fueling an arms race? Does the U. S. really gain influence
in Iran through the arms sales, or is the U. S. entangling
itself in future undesirable conflicts through its technical
involvement with the Iranian military?
By arming Iran, is the U. S. protecting Persian Gulf oil
from Soviet aggression; or is the U. S. in effect paying
ransom in arms for OPEC oil? Some suggest that the U. S.
should determine Iran's legitimate defense needs and sell
arms accordingly. Others ask whether the U. S. has a rational
arms sales policy; and if so, who in the Congress, the Depart-
ment of State or the Department of Defense controls it.
Is the Shah of Iran expanding the roles of Iran's military
to meet real threats, or is he fostering a re-birth of Persia's
ancient military might? Can he find the trained personnel to
man his new weapons without diverting manpower from Iran's
much-needed internal development programs?
Does the quantum jump in the size of his armed forces
make him more independent of the U. S. for defense, or more
dependent on U. S. technological know-how and logistical
support to make his modern equipment work?
12

These are some of the questions currently addressed by
a wide range of scholars, congressmen/ and defense experts.
The objective of this research is to answer these questions
and to outline the future implications to the U. S. of its
arms sales to Iran.
The methodology is the descriptive, case-study approach
which draws on a large volume of recent articles, papers,
Congressional reports, studies, and books.
The Iranian arms sales are examined against the background
of an historical perspective of Iranian foreign relations.
The Iranian requirements for arms and its real and potential
threats are analyzed in Chapter III. Next U. S. interests in
arms for Iran, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean are
investigated. Chapter V takes three major issues, oil, arms,
and stability - and examines them from U. S. and Iranian per-
spectives .
The concluding chapter synthesises the implications drawn
from the similarities and differences in those two perspectives
Recommendations for alternative U. S. policies are presented,




II. HISTORY OF IRAN AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE WEST
Initial contact between Iran and the West was made in 63
B.C. when the Roman Emperor, Pompey, conquered the Selucids
7
and extended the Roman Empire into present-day Iraq.
In the 16th and early 17th Centuries A.D., Shah Abbas,
a native Persian shah, opened Persia to European influences;
exchanging ambassadors with Russia, England, and other Euro-
pean countries. He also opened Iran to the European sea
trade.
Iran's modern boundaries were drawn in the 19th Century
at the conclusion of various wars between Iranian, British,
9
and Russian forces.
In 182 8 the Treaty of Turkmanchay gave Russian commercial
and consular agents entrance to Persia. The British awoke at
this time to the danger implicit to their empire in India of
Russian influence in Iran.
The British, through the entrepreneur, Baron von Reuter,
gained the concessions in 1872 to build railways and industries
in Iran. The concession was later relinquished under Russian
pressure.
7American University, Area Handbook for Iran
, p. 44,
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid
. , pp. 54 , 55.
Encyclopedia Britannica




The foreign concessions did their part in awakening
nationalism in Iran. The popular protests that arose in
1889 against a tobacco concession to the British led to its
cancellation.
The British obtained the first oil exploration concession
in Iran. It was granted to William D'Arcy in 1901, although
oil was not actually discovered until 1908.
Iranian nationalists finally wrested a constitution and a
parliament, the Majles, from Shah Mozzafar od-Din in 1906
shortly before his death.
The British and the Russians, fearing the growing threat
of German encroachments in Iran, divided the country into
spheres of influence with the Anglo-Russian convention of
1907. The Russians took the northern provinces, and the
British, the southeastern. The southwest with its oil riches
yet undiscovered, was left neutral.
This imperialistic division outraged the Iranian parliament,
In 1908 the new Shah, Mohammed Ali, suppressed the Majles,
killing many members in a shelling attack by the Persian
Cossack Brigade. The Brigade was staffed with Russian officers
hired under contract by the Shah.
Popular uprisings around the country left the Shah power-
less to quell them. Russian troops occupied Tabriz in 1909,
where one such rebellion flourished, under the pretext of
protecting Russian nationals.
By July, 1909, nationalists forces deposed Mohammed Ali in
Tehran, sent him in flight to Russia, and called his eleven-
year-old son, Ahmed Mirza, to the throne.
15

The Russians occupied the city of Kazvin, again under the
pretext of protecting their nationals. The British protested
the Russian action, and competition between the two powers
intensified.
The new Iranian regime called on the United States as an
outside balancing power to manage Iran's poor finances, In
1911 an American named William Morgan Shuster acted as Iran's
treasurer for nearly a year until his dismissal in December
under pressure and threats from Russia.
In 1913 the British Navy converted from coal to oil,
focusing British, if not world attention on Iran's primary
natural resource. During World War I, Britian and Russia
occupied parts of Iran to protect the oil and other conces-
sions from the Turks.
After the war and the Russian Revolution of 1917, the
British feared the spread of Bolshevism to India by way of
Russian influence in Iran. The British offered twelve-million
pounds-worth of financial and military assistance to Iran in
1919 - an offer which, if accepted, would have amounted to
British suzerainty in Iran. The Majles refused to ratify
the agreement.
The Russians, for their part, attempted to establish a
Soviet Socialist Republic in Gilan Province of northern Iran.
Having failed at this experiment after a year, the Soviets
signed a Treaty of Friendship with Iran in February, 1921,
cancelling all Tsarist treaties and concessions, and all
Soviet claims against Iran. Article Six, however, was a
provision for the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in
16

Iran, should Iran ever be used by a third power as staging
ground for hostilities against Russia.
In February, 1921, a young officer of the Persian Cossack
Brigade named Reza Kahn staged a coup d'etat in conjunction
with a political writer, Sayyid Zia ad-Din. Between 1921
and 1925 Reza Kahn rose to power as war minister, and as
prime minister, supplanting his cohort in the process.
Reza Kahn renamed himself Reza Pahlavi and was elected
shah by the Majles in 1925. Reza Shah thus deposed Ahmad
Mirza, the last of the Qajar rulers of Persia.
Meanwhile foreign interest and involvement in Iran con-
tinued unabated. A second American mission came to Iran in
1923 under the direction of Arthur Millspaugh, again for the
purpose of managing finances. Under Millspaugh 's successful
leadership, Iran's revenues steadily increased. His contract
ran out at the end of 19 26, however, and was not renewed.
Relations with the Soviet Union centered around a dispute
over the Russian concession in the Caspian fishing industry.
The issue was settled in the Russians' favor in 1926 after
they had placed a trade embargo on Iran.
Reza Shah responded in 1927 by renouncing the extrater-
ritorial rights of all foreign countries in Iran. Disputes
with Great Britain over the D'Arcy oil concession continued
nonetheless until 1933. The negotiations concluded that year
granted better terms to Iran on oil profits from the British-
dominated Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
Reza Shah's compaign to rid Iran of foreign influence
continued in 1935 when he removed British access to two
17

coaling stations. Further friction with the British came
from Iran's territorial claim to the Bahrain Islands.
Reza Shah officially changed the name of his country from
Persia to Iran in 1935.
Iran's relative freedom from foreign domination was
demonstrated in August, 19 38 with the opening of the first
railroad. It ran from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf,
and was built without incurring debt to any foreign country.
Germany at this time did, however, exert a dominant influence
in Iran through industrial exports, technical assistance, and
propaganda.
Iran's independence from outside domination proved to be
the lull before a storm. When signing the mutual non-aggres-
sion pact with Hitler in August, 1939, the Soviets described
Iran and the Persian Gulf as the "main area of Soviet aspira-
tions" for expansion and influence.
Following Germany's declaration of war on the USSR, poten-
tial German fifth-column operation in Iran posed a serious
threat to the Soviet resupply lines. Reza Shah was reluctant
to expel German nationals from Iran; and on August 25, 1941,
Great Britain and Russia simultaneously invaded Iran. Reza
Shah abdicated in September. His son, the present Shah, then
age 22, ascended the throne.
Nollau, Gunther, Russia's Southern Flank; Soviet
Operations in Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan
, pp. 7,8, Praeger,
1963. The Soviets expressed similar aspirations in four-power
treaty talks with Germany in November, 19 40. See Wilmot,
Chester, The Struggle for Europe, p. 71, Harper, 1952.
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Iran's communist party, the Tudeh Party, meaning "the
masses," was founded in 1942.
In January, 1942 Great Britain, Iran, and the USSR signed
a treaty in which the two great powers agreed to withdraw their
forces from Iran within six months after cessation of hostil-
ities.
Iran declared war on Germany in September, 1943.
The Soviets conducted a repressive occupation of the north-
ern Iranian provinces during the war. They would not allow
British or American personnel to enter their zone, nor would
they permit agricultural products to leave the zone to feed
the needier provinces in the south. This latter restriction
was meant to embarrass the British who occupied the southern
zone. Furthermore the Soviets demanded oil concessions in the
north on harsh terms.
After the war the Soviets refused to remove their troops
from Azerbaijan Province where they established another
"popular regime." Under stern pressure from President Truman,
and under Iranian promises of an oil concession, the Soviets
finally withdrew in 1946. The Majles later refused to ratify
the oil agreement.
Although Iran had obtained yet more favorable terms from
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. in 1949, the nationalistic Prime
Minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq, nationalized Iranian oil in May,
1951.
In September Great Britain imposed an oil embargo on Iran
which hurt the country badly. Iran lacked the technical and
managerial skills to successfully market her oil without
19

British help. Mosaddeq broke diplomatic relations with Great
Britain in August, 1952.
The Shah challenged Mosaddeq for power in 1953 and felt
forced to leave Iran. A coup by General Zahedi on August 19,
1953 brought the Shah back to Iran and to power. The United
States immediately supplied the Zahedi government with $45-
million in aid. The U. S. Central Intelligence Agency was
alleged to have supported the coup in the first place.
The oil industry was revived with the creation of an
international oil consortium under U. S. auspices in September,
1954. The consortium ran the industry in conjunction with the
National Iranian Oil Co. , with 50% of the profits going to
Iran.
Soviet influence to Iran was curtailed sharply with the
discovery and expulsion of more than 400 communist officers
in the Iranian Army in 19 54.
Iran joined the U. S. -sponsored Baghdad Pact with Turkey,
Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom in 19 55. Iraq with-
drew after a socialist coup in July, 1958. Iran signed a
bilateral defense agreement with the United States in 1959
under strong Soviet protest.
The Shah dissolved the Majles in May, 1961 for its ob-
structionism against his land-reform program. The first
land-reform law was introduced in 1962. On January 26, 1963
the Shah's so-called "White Revolution," embodying land and




Iranian relations with the Soviet Union improved after
1962, the year the Shah declared that no foreign power, imply-
ing the U. S., would stage offensive missiles on Iranian soil.
Improved Soviet-Iranian trade and oil agreements were reached
in 1964. Agreements on mutual fishing, steel, and gas devel-
opments were signed in 1965. In 1966 Iran bargained for
$110-million of "non-sensitive" military equipment from the
Soviet Union.
Iran continued to depend on the United States and Great
Britain for the majority of her arms. In response to the
Soviet deal of 1966, the United States sold Iran the F-4
Phantom jet in 1967.
Iran's reliance on the non-communist West for defense
equipment was strengthened in April, 19 72, when the Soviet
Union signed a 15-year treaty of friendship with Iran's rival,
Iraq. In October the Shah went to Moscow to reach an agree-
ment in which the Soviets assented to the Persian Gulf states'
management of their own affairs.
On 21 March, 1973 Iran fully nationalized her oil industry
through negotiation with the oil consortium. In December the
OPEC states met in Tehran and unilaterally raised their oil
prices from $3. 65-per-barrel to $8,30, and a month later to
$10.46. 12
12
"As OPEC Moves to Boost Oil Prices Again," U . S . News
and World Report
, 29 November 1976, p. 25.
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Iran's oil revenues and her military budget increased
significantly/ permitting her the substantial arms orders
from the United States which are the subject of this thesis.
One of the major justifications for these sales was
diminished on 6 March 1975 at the Algiers Conference where
Iran ended her long-standing disputes with Iraq over waterway
rights, national boundaries, and the Kurdish rebellion.
22

III. IRANIAN SECURITY INTERESTS
U. S. arms sales to Iran have been most often requested
and justified on the grounds that Iran is required to insure
its own physical security. The Shah has said, "Those who
depend on others for their defence because they do not have
the means, the guts or the will to provide their own, are no
longer countries."
In talking about his threats the Shah stated, "Don't
forget that we have [threats from] four directions, as any
14
other country in the world." He adds, "Everybody knows
that if this country is attacked, we are going to resist..."
A major problem for the U.S. is to measure these threats
and sell arms accordingly. National sovereignty and self-
defense are critical and sensitive questions, particularly in
the evaluation of one country's threats and security problems
by another. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger noted, "It should
be remembered, that we are dealing with sovereign nations whose




"Persia Once More," The Economist , 31 October 1970,
Vol. 237, No. 6636, p. vii-vlii.
14
"Remarks by Shah On Iran's Policies," The New York
Times
, 24 September 1975, p. 8.
15 T,.,Ibid .
16
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Defense Department
Report, Fiscal Year 1976
, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975
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The threats to Iran could indeed come from many directions.
Iran is a non-Arab country in an almost totally Arab environ-
ment. Additionally Iran has the dubious distinction of being
the only major Persian Gulf oil-producer to share a common
border with the Soviet Union. Finally, being extremely de-
pendent on oil to pay for its development, Iran is quite con-
cerned about the safety of oil-carrying sea lines of communi-
cation (S.L.O.C.) from the Persian Gulf out into the Indian
Ocean.
These potential threats are examined here, beginning with
Iran's immediate neighbors, and expanding to the Persian Gulf
regional area, and to the Indian Ocean and the major powers.
A. IRANIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS
Probably the biggest and most visible threat perceived by
Iran is its neighbor to the west, Iraq. Though smaller in
land and in population than Iran (one-third Iran's population),
Iraq poses a paramount threat; both by itself and in combin-
ation with other factors.
Since the assassination of Iraqi King Faisel II in July,
1958, Iran has viewed the radical Baathist-socialist leader-
ship in Iraq with much concern. At the time of the coup, it
17
"caused grave consternation in the Iranian cabinet."
Almost immediately the status quo changed. A traditional
monarch had been displaced by a leftist-socialist government.
17Avery, P., Modern Iran, p. 479, Praeger, 1965
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In November, 1958 Abd ' al-Kassem expanded Iraq's ter-
ritorial waters to twelve miles, and Iran did likewise. In
March, 1959 Iraq withdrew from the U.S .-sponsored regional
military alliance, the Baghdad Pact composed of Turkey, Iraq,
Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom (U.S. as observer).
Iraq's departure undermined any chance of real regional
security and cooperation.
1. Shatt al-Arab Dispute
The next major source of tension between the two
countries was stirred up in 1959-1960 by the matter of the
Shatt al-Arab (Arvand-Rud) waterway. This waterway problem
resulted from the Treaty of Erzerum in 1847 and the Frontier
Treaty in 1937, which stated that "the International boundary
18
should lie in part at the low-water mark on the Iranian side."
The problem arose with discovery of oil and the development
of Iranian ports at Khorramshahr and Abadan. Iran's shipping
channel to the Persian Gulf lay in Iraqi territory.
Iran claimed that these early treaties were counter to
the normal practice of setting boundaries on median, or
"thalweg," lines - a practice which would have given both
riparian states navigational rights. Iran stated that the
old treaties were forced on her by the colonial powers,
Turkey and Britain.
18American University, op. cit
. , p. 318. See also Chubin,
Shahram and Sephr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran
,
University of California Press, 1974, p. 171. See also
Ghavami, Taghi . "Shatt-al-Arab Crisis," Naval War College
Review
, September-October 1974, Vol. XXVII No. 4, p. 58.
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For a period of time Iran was forced to pay duties
to Iraq for use of the waterway. Follow-on meetings were
called to reduce the unsatisfactory situation, but Iraq was
generally reluctant to make any changes.
In 1959 Iran charged Iraq with interfering with its
ships in the waterway. Both sides issued charges and counter-
charges, and they alerted their armed forces. Neither side
was willing, however, to push the issue to hostilities. The
Shah made the following statement about the dispute:
In the past we had agreements with Iraq on the Shatt al-
Arab which were never respected by Iraq. . .Naturally a
river which forms the boundary between two nations can-
not be used exclusively by one side only... We cannot
accept the imperialistic policy of Iraq in this respect.
We hope, however, that the government will accept our
friendship, adopt a good neighborly policy, and not only
try to settle all outstanding differences but also make
it possible for the two nations to maintain the best
possible relations as two good neighbors. 19
The boundary matter subsided for a short while, but
re-emerged in February-May, 1961, when Iraq shut down the
waterway, stranding ships in Iranian ports and causing re-
duced production and exportation of Iranian oil. Iraq again
resisted entering meaningful discussions. Iran agreed to a
status quo solution, pending the outcome of negotiations
which never came to pass.
On both past occasions, Iran felt unprepared mili-
tarily to extract concessions from Iraq. Then for the third
time in the decade a confrontation was made over the waterway
In April, 1969 the Iraqi government informed the Iranians
19Chubin and Zabih, op. cit
. , p. 17 3
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that henceforth the waterway was Iraqi territory, that the
Iranian flag would be lowered, and that Iranian nationals
aboard ships transiting Iraqi water would disembark.
Iran viewed this as an ultimatum and replied firmly.
Tehran unilaterally annulled the 1937 treaty, alerted its
naval and air forces, and sent naval escorts with Iranian
ships transiting the river. The Iraqis protested but made
no military response.
Since April, 1969 there has been de facto Iranian use
of the Shatt al-Arab. Iranians have flown their flag, have
used Iranian pilots, and have not paid duties to Iraq.
On 6 March 1975 after talks held in Algeria, Iran
and Iraq signed a joint Communique that defined "their mari-
20time borders in accordance with the thalweg line" (middle
of deepest shipping channel)
.
Although this dispute has ended favorably for Iran,
it did require Iran to make some concessions. Support to
the Kurdish rebels in Iraq was ended and the Iranian border
was closed to them as well. A new border through the disputed
Nafte al-Shah oil region was also agreed to.
2. Kurdish Rebels
Another major conflict between Iran and Iraq besides
the Shatt al-Arab has been the Kurdish problem. The Kurds
are a large ethnic group of almost 2.5 million people, in-
habiting parts of Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and the U.S.S.R.
20
"Extract From the Text of the Iraqi-Iranian Joint
Communique," Middle East Economic Digest , 14 March 1975,
p. 19. See also Appendix D.
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In Iran they live in the Zagros Mountains of the Western
Frontier. In Iraq they live along the border with Iran and
comprise 15-20% of the population there. They are related
to the Persians ethnically by religon and by language. They
do differ, however, in their culture and in their tribal
organization from other Persians.
Iran has supported integration of the Kurds into
Iranian society, and has also developed the Kurdish area of
the country. Iraq, on the other hand, has been suspicious of
its 1.5-million Kurds, owing to their Persian ethnic relation-
ship.
Since 1932 Iraqi Kurds have sought independence. The
prevailing level of violence was raised to a civil war in 1961
By 1966 Iraq charged Iran with arming and supporting the
Kurdish rebels. Ineffective cease-fires have occurred since
that time.
The Shatt al-Arab agreement in March, 1975 finally
called for an end to all Iranian support for the Iraqi Kurds.
This ended one of the major sources of friction between Iran
and Iraq.
3. Soviet Influence
Iranians have suggested that the Shatt al-Arab agree-
ments were signed by the Shah in part because of "his appre-
hension of increasing Soviet influence in that country"
21(Iraq). Since the Iraqi coup in 1958, Iran has viewed the
21Pajak, R. F. , "Soviet Military Aid to Iraq and Syria,"
Strategic Review
, Winter 1976, p. 51.
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increasing Soviet presence in Iraq with concern. Not only
did the Russians sell and give Iraq large quantities of modern
arms, but also they sent technical and military advisors to
Iraq and made frequent naval visits to Iraqi ports. If Umm
Qasr has not become an outright Soviet naval base, it has
become a major stop for the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron.
The Russian presence in Iraq, especially the naval
presence, has caused the Shah concern. He has often cited
this concern as a reason for his own armament efforts. He
fears the combined pressure of the Soviet presence to the
West in Iraq, Soviet influence to the East in India, and
Soviet forces to the North along the 1200-mile border with
Iran.
4 . Persian Gulf Disputes
Iran took by force the two Tumb Islands in the Persian
Gulf near the Straits of Hormuz in December, 1971. The nearby
island of Abu Musa was obtained the month before by negotiation,
Iran claimed that these three islands had to be controlled by
a strong country to prevent rebels from gaining control and
wrecking havoc with Persian Gulf shipping. Iraq saw this as
another move toward Iranian hegemony in the area and broke
diplomatic relations with Iran over the matter.
There has been friction over Iraqi exploitation of
a common subterranean oil source near Khaneghain, Iraq and
Nafte-Shah, Iran. Iran has also allegedly infringed on Iraqi
territorial waters in the Persian Gulf with off-shore drill-
ing on the continental shelf.
29

5. Iranians in Iraq
One other issue that causes tension between Iran and
Iraq is the alleged harrassment of Iranian pilgrims visiting
Islamic holy places in Iraq. Not only pilgrims, but also
30/000 Iranian citizens who lived and worked in Iraq have
been persecuted, tortured, and evicted from Iraq.
B. RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA
Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia, the only other major
Persian Gulf regional power, are generally good. Saudi Arabia
is the world's largest exporter of oil (Iran is second), and
also has the largest known oil reserves.
The two countries have many similarities, including "a
common concern for the monarchical form of government, strong
ties with the West and a distaste for, and distrust of,
22Communist intentions."
Especially since the 1967 War, relations between these
two important neighbors have been good and the trend is toward
more cooperation. Until 1967 the largest difference had been
a border question in the sea bed of the Persian Gulf. This
matter was successfully resolved in October, 1968 when both
countries agreed essentially to draw a line down the middle
of the Gulf.
Saudi Arabia was favorably impressed over the Shah's
peaceful acceptance of the Bahrain plebicite in 1971, and
appreciates the stability Iran now provides for the Persian




Gulf. Iran has been impressed by her neighbor's economic
wealth and ability to play a major role in restoring peace
in general to the Middle East.
The two countries hold similar views on the need for
local peace and stability. They are both opposed to radical
groups and communist influence. Saudi Arabia's oil minister,
Sheik Yamani, has stated that "Iran and Saudi Arabia have
'so many things in common* that 'we benefit from a strong
23
Iran.'"
Recently an issue has arisen which may well cause concern
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, namely the OPEC oil prices.
Iran, in spite of all the Shah's pronouncements, has been a
hard-liner in desiring higher oil prices. He opted for the
10%, plus 5% later, increase at the December, 1976 OPEC
meeting.
Saudia Arabia, through its influential oil minister,
strained OPEC relations by announcing that Saudia Arabia and
the U.A.E. would support only a 5% increase. This single
action may have spelled the doom of OPEC as an effective
cartel. Due to the large development plans already underway
in Iran and the oil revenues required to fulfill them, the
Saudi stance has had a major negative effect on Iran and on
many of the other OPEC members.
23
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This issue is extremely sensitive and bears careful
watching. When asked if the pricing policy might cause ten-
sion, the Shah responded:
...there never would be conflict involving Iran and Saudi
Arabia. Differences between myself and Saudi Arabia never
existed, except at the last meeting of OPEC. "24
The only other matter which might mar Saudi-Iranian re-
lations is Persian hegemony. While the Saudis do now ack-
knowledge that Iranian military might is helpful in providing
stability to the region, the future remains uncertain.
Any Iranian expansionist policy to the detriment of her
Gulf neighbors is likely to put Saudi Arabia in a natural
role as the Arab leader of the only regional countering force
available.
Saudi Arabia is also currently undertaking a major arms
build-up, and sales are mostly from the U. S. Items include
F-5 fighters, M-60 tanks, and a large amount of base con-
struction. (See Appendix G)
Still it is hard to call this an arms race. "Iran is
consciously grooming itself as a military power .. .whereas
Saudi Arabia gives its defence plans a low profile, in spite
24
of their size."
Sheik Yamani has stated on this subject that he saw no
"immediate objection to the United States' proposed arms
24
"Tough Talk on Oil, Arms, Investments," Business Week
,
24 January 1977, p. 36.
25




sales to Iran," but that he "hoped that the fears of some
Arabs that Iran was 'dreaming of taking some parts of the
2 f.
Arab world 1 would not materialize."
In the absence of Iranian expansion plans, and in spite
of differences on the price of oil, some believe there remains
"nonetheless a strong political incentive for the two countries
to cooperate (or at least contain the rivalry) in order to
27preserve the stability of the region." There has even been
talk of formal military cooperation between Iran and Saudi
Arabia.
"'Our relations are improving every day,' said Ambassador
Ali Riza Heravi, the Iranian foreign ministry spokesman.
'We have so much in common. We have oil, we both belong
to OPEC. We have no differences.'" 28
C. KUWAIT
Iranian concern with tiny (7,780 sq. mi.) and rich
($10 , 000-per-capita in 1974) Kuwait rests mainly in regard
to the weakness of this oil-state. Iran fears that Kuwait
might possibly be taken over by a radical Iraqi government.
Iran recalls that in 1961, almost as soon as Kuwait
achieved full independence from Britain, it faced a crisis.
The Iraqi Premier at the time, Ma j . Gen. Abdul Karim
Kassim, claimed all of Kuwait as an integral part of
Iraq. Kuwait, still connected with Britain in a treaty
26
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of protection, received British troops who were stationed
near the Iraqi border. An Arab League force later re-
placed the British. *
When Iraq embargoed Kuwait, Iran, fully supporting this
new neighbor, ferried food to Kuwait in launches across the
Gulf. They also provided naval escorts when these launches
were fired upon by Iraqi gunboats, and they allowed the
British the use of Iranian airspace during the incident.
Furthermore Iran established diplomatic relations with
Kuwait in spite of Iraqi warnings that to do so would endanger
their mutual relations. Iraq found little support even among
its Arab neighbors to back its claim on Kuwait, and Iran was
again alerted to the possibility of future territorial claims
by the Baghdad government.
In March, 1973 there were armed clashes along the 99-mile
Iraqi-Kuawaiti border, which had not been officially delin-
eated. Iraq was again unsuccessful. These actions were
considered as pressure on Kuwait to lease or relinquish two
islands, Bubiyan and Warba, which lie near the Iraqi port of
Umm Qasr.
The islands, which command the entrance to this new
port, were described by Iraq's foreign minister, Abdul-Baqi,
as essential for Iraq. He added that "without the two islands
Iraq 'will not be a Gulf State* and warned that if the two
29
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,
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islands were occupied by foreign troops, 'Iraq would be cut
30
off completely from the Gulf. 1 "
It was reported that Iraq really wanted the islands "to
protect the port, (Umm Qasr) where Soviet naval vessels called
frequently following the signing in 1972 of a 15-year treaty
31
of friendship and cooperation.
"
This pressure from Iraq still continues. In February,
1977 a Kuwaiti foreign affairs official stated: "There are
a few hundred Iraqis on our side of the frontier, here and
32
there. But we do not consider it a major crisis." Iraq's
aims evidently remain the same.
The Iraqi pressure on the desert frontier is intended
as a lever to persuade the Kuwaitis to cede or lease
Bubiyan Island, say Kuwaiti government officials. They
say there is no intention here of doing so.33
Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are concerned about Iraq's
designs on Kuwait and the two islands. A takeover of Kuwait
by Iraq would greatly enhance Baghdad's economic power.
Iran is pleased that Kuwait is upgrading its military
capabilities with 36 U. S. A-4 Skyhawks, Hawk surface-to-air
missiles, and 20 French-built F-l Mirage jets.
30de Onis, Juan. "Iraq-Kuwait Talk on Boundary Due,"
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Iran's relations with Bahrain were in a large part con-
cerned with Iran's claim to the island country. Iranian
interest in Bahrain dates back to the 1500 's when Iran occupied
part of Bahrain. Although forced to leave, Iran has never
dropped its claims with neither the follow-on Arab leaders
of Bahrain nor the British.
In 1971 when Britain was about to withdraw from the Gulf
and Bahrain, Iran again pressed its claim. The Shah, how-
ever, took a very moderate position, endorsing a United
Nations "determination process," and also agreeing to the
results: "virtually unanimous desire for independence as an
34Arab state."
Supporters have often cited this incident as an example
of the Shah's moderate policies, as opposed to those who
stress Iranian expansionist aims.
Jufair harbor at Manama, Bahrain is the home port of the
U. S. Navy's three-ship Middle East Force. The basing agree-
ment with the new government of Bahrain was signed 23 December
1971, and was made to "continue the Middle East naval force
as a flag-showing operation to manifest United States interest
35in the area.
"
34American University, op. cit
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After the October 1973 War, Bahrain in a gesture of
solidarity with the Arab cause, notified the United States
that it would have to withdraw its small naval force within
,,36
a year.
COMMIDEASTFOR has remained in Bahrain, however.
The Iranian and Saudi governments are believed to have
pressed Bahrain to rescind the order for American with-
drawal so that some American military presence would
remain in the gulf. 37
Iran continues to support for the short term a U. S.
presence in Bahrain, at least while Soviet naval forces still
frequent the Gulf.
E. OMAN
Iranian-Omani relations are among the best in the Gulf.
Oman has been an independent monarchy since 1650. The major
factor involving the two countries is Persian Gulf security.
Since 1965 the Sultan of Oman has faced a direct threat
from the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman
(P.F.L.O.), a force of guerrillas operating mostly in the
remote and economically-neglected Dhofar Province.
38The Dhofar rebels - sometimes called "militant Maoist,"
and listed at 750 to 1,000 in strength - controlled an area
3 fi
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with a population of up to 50,000 (of Oman's 600,000 popu-
lation) . The rebels had Chinese support in the beginning.
In 1968, following the British withdrawal from bases at
Aden, the rebels made major gains in Dhofar Province. The
group changed its name to "The Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of the Occupied Arabian Gulf" (PFLOAG) and received
additional aid from the U.S.S.R., Saudi Arabia, the People's
Democratic Republic of Yeman, Cuba, and China.
1970 saw the aging Sultan Said Bin Taimur of Oman deposed
by his son, Qabus. The new leader undertook enlarged military
operations after his initial amnesty offer to the rebels failed,
The enlarged Omani Army led by British officers and Baluchi
(Pakistani) non-com's produced more effective results than
in the past.
A 50 km. barbed wire minefield barrier was completed in
August, 1974, which greatly reduced infiltration efforts from
the West (the P.D.R.Y.). Iranian assistance started in
September, 1972 with a three-helicopter unit. In late 1973
a thousand or more Iranian ground troops fought as part of
a battalion of the Sultan's Armed Forces.
On 18 November 1973, P.D.R.Y. aircraft bombed Omani ter-
ritory, and since then Iran has taken on the responsibility
of the air defense of Oman. Iran moved F-5E fighters, CH-47
helicopters and Augusta-Bell 205 helicopter gunships to Oman,
as well as radars and anti-aircraft guns, to assist in the
actions against the rebels.
38

The Omani armed forces expanded to about 12,000 men, and
the Iranian armed forces at one time numbered 4500 at the
39height of the war.
On December 11 ('75) the Sultan announced that the 10-year
struggle of the rebels, who call themselves the People's
Front for the Liberation of Oman, had ended after a
successful army offensive.
Accordingly in January, 1977, "the Shah of Iran decided
to withdraw most of his troops from Oman," which then numbered
41
about 3,200. Some units remain, and the Iranian "Imperial
Air Force continues its regular flights across Omani air
„42
space.
Relations with Oman have been important for Iran. The
Shah sees rebel action there as a positive threat to "the
soft underbelly" of Arabia, and more importantly to the critical
nearby Straits of Hormuz.
The heavy Iranian military commitment and losses (one
RF-4 lost and about 100 men killed) demonstrate his concern
in the area. The Shah said that "if Oman were taken over by
those savage communists, what would have happened to the whole
43Persian Gulf region?"
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Iran is also involved in talks with Oman which would "allow
Iran's navy to enforce pollution-control regulations in the
44
strategically important sector of Oman waters," the Straits
of Hormuz. This is seen by some as an opportunity for Iran
to increase its influence in this area under the guise of
anti-pollution patrols.
Still the Shah's concern shows some insight, hypothesizing
that a terrorist with one rocket fired from the Omni coast
could hole or sink a 500,000-ton tanker whose oil leakage
"would wreck the gulf possibly forever."
You could not clean out so much oil in such a place - the
detergent required would ruin the Gulf Waters for years.
We cannot permit this. 4 5
F. REGIONAL IRANIAN SECURITY INTERESTS
In addition to the specific security concerns involving
its individual immediate neighbors, Iran has a wider security
interest in the Persian Gulf as a whole. These broader in-
terests are dictated by the fact that Iran is a Persian Gulf
oil producer, but a non-Arab one. Oil and the problem of
Palestine are the issues that highlight Iran's security in-
terests on a regional basis.
The crux of Iran's Persian Gulf security problem is the
attempt not to mix oil and business with politics.
44 Pace, Eric. "Iran and Oman Combat Oil Spills in Gulf,"
The New York Times , 16 February 1975, p. 2.
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Indeed, under a comprehensive agreement worked out in
early 1962 between Israeli Finance Minister Levi Eshkol
and the N.I.O.C. [National Iranian Oil Company], Iran
has supplied crude oil for Israeli consumption. 4 6
The Shah has stated on the matter of oil to Israel:
Once the tankers are loaded we don't mind where the oil
goes. We have never really boycotted any country. We
think that politics and commerce are separate. 47
He went on to say that Iran would in fact supply Israel
additional oil, if Israel gave up its Abu Rudeis oil fields
in the Sinai as part of the Arab-Israeli peace settlement.
Iran's supplying oil to Israel places Iran at odds with
most Arab countries, which are strongly committed to the
Palestinian cause against Israel. To compensate somewhat
for this stance, and to get along better in an Arab world,
Iran has taken political and economic initiatives.
Iran has increased its high-level visits to the Arab
states, and has given them some degree of foreign aid and
soft loans.
Iran has supported the Arab states in their desire to
regain the territories lost in the 1967 War. She has
also provided humanitarian assistance to the Arabs and
joined with other Muslim states in calling for the return
of Jerusalem to Muslim control. 48
In another move toward better regional relations, Iran
renewed diplomatic relations with Iraq on 15 October 1973.
These relations, recognizing the "Sovereignty of the two
46
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neighboring Islamic states... in accordance with their strong
49historic relations," were agreed to on the eve of the
October, 1973 War so that Iraq could "donate all its resources
to the great national battle."
As for actual relations with Israel, Iran does not feel
the same enmity toward Israel as do the Arab countries. Iran
has "continued her commercial relations with Israel and publicly
51
affirmed (in 196 7) the latter state's right to existence."
The Shah has also spoken on this issue
It may have been true during the Nassers [sic] enmity
toward Iran, when we were weak, that it was to our interest
that the Arab Israeli dispute be kept alive. But that's
not so any longer. 52
Placating his neighbors a degree further, the Shah states,
"Of course Israel will have the heart to go back to her
53(original) borders."
Certainly the Shah's primary interests in regional Gulf
security are to be able to keep exporting high-priced oil,
and in turn be able to pay for Iran's imports. These goals
were emphasized in a 27 September 1958 press interview.
49
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Questioner: The source of our biggest income, oil, is
exported through the Gulf. Moreover, we are embarking
on oil extraction from the offshore areas. All these
require that we should be strong in this area and that
we should have a strong navy.
The Shah: Iran's supremacy over the Persian Gulf is a
natural thing. We already have this and shall enhance
it in the future. ^
4
With oil revenues so important to its livelihood and to
that of other Gulf states, Iran does not want the situation
upset by turmoil such as the 1958 Iraqi coup. The Shah has
55
said, "Our policy is to keep the status quo in the area."
Iran has attempted unsuccessfully to form a regional
security arrangement with neighboring countries. They evi-
dently are wary of any pact that would give legitimacy to
Iran's suspected aims of hegemony in the area.
Earlier statements from the Shah, such as, "We are doing
everything we can to regain our historic and natural position
in the Persian Gulf," and "Since we are the dominant power
in the Persian Gulf, we must rapidly strengthen our navy,"
have not made regional cooperation easier for the Arab Gulf
states.
54Chubm and Zabih, op. cit .
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The Shah is prepared to go ahead without their help.
We are for a regional cooperation pact. If it comes, so
much the better. Otherwise Iran must be strong enough
to be able to do it alone. 58
Additionally the Shah has played down any hint of Gulf
area rivalry, but he notes that the Arab states "without
Iran to defend them would be dead."
Our first choice is to consult with all Arab countries
on an equal basis. Our second choice is to go it alone
if necessary. 59
Iran took much pride in the fact that it was a leader
in aiding Oman in its fight against the Dhofar rebels. The
Shah viewed this action as the first big step in improving
Gulf security.
Even so, some Arabs saw danger in the Iranian military
action in Dhofar. Some saw it as merely a live-training
exercise for an expansionist-minded country.
On the whole, however, the Shah has been sensitive to
the fears of his Arab neighbors, and has attempted to accom-
modate them when possible. The end of overt Iranian support
for the Kurds; the March, 1975 border agreement with his
long-time rival, Iraq; and the fairly prompt withdrawal of
his combat troops from Oman have demonstrated the Shah's
sensitivity toward those fears.
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G. INDIAN OCEAN SECURITY INTERESTS
Iran's interests in the security of the Indian Ocean
encompass two major concerns. First there is the concern
for the freedom of Iran's oil-carrying sea lines of communi-
cation, and second there is the concern about outisde inter-
ference from the major powers.
Not only must oil-carrying tankers be able to load their
oil and get through the Straits of Hormuz , but also they must
be able to continue on to Japan, Europe, and America unmo-
lested, if Iran is to be assured of steady revenues. The
Shah said:
We are forced to devote attention to our eastern frontier,
our active presence in the Indian Ocean, and the unhampered
shipment of our oil from the Persian Gulf to other parts
of the world. 60
A large part of Iran's policy to influence events and
safeguard oil routes in the Indian Ocean is tied to its naval
expansion program. The Shah has noted that "Iran once had a
first-class navy, and it is fitting that she should regain
her position among maritime nations."
It has also been observed that
The Iranian navy is already the strongest naval power in
the Persian Gulf today, but wishes to extend its influence
to the Indian Ocean as well. Iranian naval units con-
stantly participated in maneuvers with allied or friendly
navies that are held not only in the Gulf but frequently
1976,
61
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also in the Indian Ocean. In November 1972 as many as
40 Iranian warships were reported at sea. 62
Iran easily realizes that
In case of a serious conflict, the power enjoying maritime
supremacy in the Indian Ocean could cut off this commercial
traffic, which would have very rapid and grave consequences . 6 3
Iran does not want this to happen. Its acquisitions of
long-range P-3F maritime patrol planes and large, 6,800-ton
Spruance-class destroyers are signs that Iran is carrying
through its plans for a truely ocean-going navy.
Iran's naval units reportedly hold regular exercises
with Pakistani submarines. Iran also participated in CENTO 's
MIDLINK '74, "the largest naval exercise ever held in the
64Indian Ocean.
"
Iran accepts the current status of the super-powers'
presence in the Indian Ocean, but looks forward to a change.
Our principal first-choice policy will be to see the
Persian Gulf and then the Indian Ocean eventually free
of outside powers. This means nonriparian states. But
as long as some powers are there, we would not only object
to the presence of the U.S. but on the contrary we would
welcome it."
6 2
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Reflecting a pro-U.S. policy/ the Shah has stated that
he "certainly would prefer to have the Indian Ocean policed
by riparian states," but "as long as the Russian Navy shows
66
a strong presence in the Gulf," the U.S. should remain.
Until we can police our own ocean we cannot be surprised
to see the superpowers in presence here. fi 7
For the long-term the Shah and his neighbors support the
concept of the Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace."
The Conference of Nonalligned Countries meeting at Lusaka
in September 1970 called upon 'all states to consider
and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from
which great power rivalries and competition, as well as
bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and
competition, either army, navy, or air force bases, are
excluded. ' 68
When and if this will ever really happen is highly problematic
Intermixed in many of the local and regional security
matters have been the relations of Iran with the major powers;
the U.S.S.R. , the U.S., and to a lesser extent, China.
H. RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R.
Iranian-Soviet relations have a long history, most of it
adverse to Iran. In the 1800' s under Russian pressure, their
common border gradually crept south. While well aware of its
inferior position vis-a-vis its giant northern neighbor,
"'Why Should We?' Cut the Price of Oil to U.S.,"
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Iran has for the most part sought to retain an independent
course of action.
The early part of the Twentieth Century saw Persia, though
an independent country, dominated by two major powers: Tsarist
Russia and Great Britain. They divided Iran between them for
commercial purposes. Both countries occupied Iran during
World War I, but the Russian Revolution caused the withdrawal
of the Russian troops.
The new Soviet government, while renouncing the previous
claims on Iran, acted much like the old Tsarist regime. A
Red naval force bombarded Iran's port, Enzeli, on 18 May 1920
and occupied the city. Soviet troops later pushed further
and announced the establishment of a Persian Soviet Socialist
Republic in Gilan Province.
A year and a half later the Soviets finally left. Iran
in the meantime had changed leaders in 192 3 when Reza Shah,
the present Shah's father, gained effective control.
The next major Soviet involvement with Iran occurred
during World War II. After the War a secret Soviet-German
agreement was recovered, in which the Soviets demanded Iran
as a sphere of influence.
...the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction
of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the
aspirations of the Soviet Union. 69
British and Russian forces entered Iran on 18 September
1941 to eliminate the German presence and later to provide a
69Andrews, Ma j . W.R., "The Azerbaijan Incident,"
Military Review
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supply route to Russia. The British controlled southern
Iran, and the Soviets held the north.
At the end of the war, the two powers were to withdraw
their troops. As the British and American forces were leaving,
however, the Russians increased their troops and tanks in
Azerbaijan Province, secured the area, and supported a sep-
aratist movement in Kurdistan. It was not until the U. S.
threatened action that the Soviets finally left Iran in May,
1946.
It is against this historical setting of continued Russian
encroachment and occupation in the two World Wars that modern
Soviet-Iranian relations are set. Although current relations
are described as good, caution persists. Iran's alignment
with the pro-Western Baghdad Pact in 19 55 "infuriated the
Russians who viewed the establishment of a tier of hostile
Muslim states along the border as just the situation they had
70
always sought to avoid."
To counter this Pact, the Soviets made inroads in Iraq,
Iran's arch-rival. The U.S.S.R. also tried to implement a
Soviet-Iranian non-aggression pact in 1959. The talks failed,
the U.S. and Iran signed an alliance, and the Soviets charged
that the Shah "'under [U.S.] pressure' had followed a double-
dealing and false policy against the Soviet Union' and had
71forced Iran to join 'the ranks of enemies' of the U.S.S.R.
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The change in big power relationships in the early
1960's produced a thaw in Iranian-Soviet relations. A more
confident Shah was able to pledge to the Russians that he
would "'not grant to any foreign state 1 the right to establish
72
rocket bases on Iranian territory."
The next year the two countries signed the first of
several trade agreements. By late 1963 Soviet President
Brezhnev visited Iran and stated that "we and Iran have no
73
mutual claims to each other - either territorial or material."
Iran scholar Sepehr Zabih states, "Despite outward cord-
iality, Iranian relations with the Soviet Union have been
74
characterized by a lingering mistrust. " He lists three
reasons for his conclusion: 1) The Soviets have influence in
nearby states, i.e., Iraq, Afghanistan, and India. 2) U.S.-
U.S.S.R. detente may be detrimental to Iranian interests.
3) The Soviets still desire a warm-water port in the Indian
75Ocean area.
Iran has been concerned with heavy Soviet arms deliveries
to Iraq, starting in 1958. The U.S.S.R.'s Treaty of Friend-
ship and Trade with Iraq in 1971 did not ease Iran's concern.
Iran also finds the Soviet aid to India and a similar treaty
72 Ibid
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unsettling. The 1973 coup in Afghanistan and that country's
subsequent alignment toward the Soviet Union causes Iran addi-
tional uneasiness. Iran feels surrounded by the Soviet in-
fluence in these three countries, not to mention Mother Russia
herself.
Iran is wary of the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron that
appeared within months of the British announcement of 1968 of
their intention to leave the area. Since 1968 the Soviet
naval units have grown steadily in number and in ship-day
presence (Appendix H) . Soviet usage of port facilities at
Umm Qasr, Iraq and at Berbera, Somalia also aggravate the
situation for Iran.
While present relations with the Soviet Union are usually
described as good, the term must be used cautiously. Although
large trade agreements have been made; and General Toufanian,
Iran's Vice-Minister of War, recently made a military shopping
tour in Moscow (23-30 November 1976), Iran looks upon the
Russians with suspicion. The Shah regularly includes his long
border with the U.S.S.R. as partial justification for his
arms buys, and he often highlights communism as a major threat.
7 6
"My only opponents are the Communists."
I. IRANIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS
Though of recent origin, Iran's relations with the People's
Republic of China have been steadily developing. As late as
1971 the main Chinese activity affecting Iran was China's
7 fi
"The Shah: Thoughts of a Royal Decision Maker," Time
,
4 November 1974, p. 34.
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support to the Dhofar rebels in Oman. It was to both parties 1
benefit not to continue opposing each other in Oman, however,
in the face of a larger common concern, the Soviet Union.
In 1971 Iran and China established diplomatic relations,
and Empress Farah visited China that next year. In June, 1973
Chinese Foreign Minister Peng-Fei visited Tehran and "expres-
sed support for Iran's military build-up as a natural and
logical response to any potential threat of subversion or
77
expansion in the Persian Gulf."
As a definite anti-Soviet move he also agreed that
only littoral states should provide security for the Gulf.
These actions and statements evidently reflected a change in
Chinese concerns.
In recent weeks Peking has let it be known through various
channels that it is now less concerned about the Soviet
threat along its northern frontier than about growing
Soviet influence in southern Asia and the Persian Gulf.
Not without some justification Peking fears that Moscow
could use this influence to create an anti-Chinese
alliance along China's southern flank. 78
The new and improving relations with Iran seem to fit
well with China's new evolutions. Chinese fear of Soviet
encirclement also impinge on Iran in new areas, most impor-
tantly the India-Pakistan conflict. China supports Iran's
neighbor, Pakistan, against India and its protector state,
the Soviet Union.
7
Zabih, "Iran Today," p. 66
7 8
Hess, "The Indian Ocean," p. 11
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While Chinese-Iranian relations are not of critical im-
portance now, they are improving and could become more im-
portant in the near future.
J. U.S. -IRANIAN RELATIONS
The Shah has plainly stated that "relations with the
United States now are excellent," and "there is no reason
79
why they should not continue that way."
President Nixon during his brief stop in Iran on 30 May
1972 likewise stressed the importance of U.S. support to Iran.
Nixon noted "that it is vital that we build our policy on the
alliances and friendships that we have had in the past, that
80
we have now, and that we hope to have in the future."
As between any two countries, problems are bound to exist.
The major problems between Iran and the United States are the
U.S. arms sales policy, and Iran's fear of big power dominance.
The Shah has openly stated that he cannot understand U.S.
reluctance to let him buy whatever arms he desires. He sees
Iran as an independent state that knows where it is going and
what it needs. Outside advice and restrictions are viewed
as meddling and paternalistic. He took a threatening tone in
a Business Week interview regarding arms sales.
If officials of the new U.S . Administration tried to
influence OPEC members by threatening to cut off arms
sales, how would you react?
79
"'Why Should We? 1 Cut the Price of Oil to U.S.,"
U.S. News and World Report , 6 May 1974, p. 35.
8 Semple, R.B., Jr., "Nixon Welcomed Warmly by Iranians,"
The New York Times, 31 May 1972, p. 1.
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They are free to sell their arms to whom they please
as I am free to sell my oil. We can shop around the world
to fill our needs. Remember, too, that Iran could be a
$10 billion-a-year market that you would lose.
Do you mean that if the U.S . does not sell arms to
Iran , Iran would curtail civilian purchases from the U.S .
?
* 81Yes, of course.
Likewise he states that those who criticize his country
for its human rights policies don't understand his country
and its government. In fact he counterattacks with the pro-
posal that the "freedoms" allowed in the West will lead those
countries to become "decadent" and "sick."
In his view, the political factionalism and lack of public
order that he sees in the United States and West Europe
will ultimately bring about their decline. 82
The Shah believes that Iran has been victimized by the
big powers, including the U.S., for years through low prices
paid for his oil. He continues to be plagued by the effects
of high Western inflation, if not outright price gouging, in
the arms and other commodities he must import.
'The bill that they are every day presenting us is some-
thing ridiculous.' The Shah cited 'the way that you are
increasing your prices,' and asserted that 'every kind of
commodity' sold by the industrial countries to the rest
of the world was affected by inflation because those
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Iran has consistently pushed for higher oil prices at
the various OPEC meetings despite U.S. calls for restraint.
Part of the Shah's justification for higher oil prices was
that
his country wanted to warn the world that it must find
other energy sources to heat homes and run trains lest
oil fields run dry in 30 years. Oil is too precious for
such uses, he said, because it forms the basic material
for thousands of derivatives in the petrochemical field. 84
Iran has supplied oil to Israel for some time with Wash-
ington's approval. Also Iran did not engage in the OPEC oil
boycott of the U.S. and Israel following the October 1973
War. The Shah promises he will not embargo oil in the future
either.
The Shah of Iran : We have never really boycotted
anybody. It is not part of our policy. We think that
politics and commerce are separate. We have not taken
part in the first oil embargo, and we will not take part
in any other embargo. No embargo can work anymore,
because we have tremendous oil reserves in both Europe
and other countries of the world. I believe they have
90 days' reserve, and today's wars cannot last more than
three weeks. So I don't really believe in that. But if
it comes, we are not going to put an embargo on oil. 8 5
Although Iran did not, and says it will not boycott oil,
the Shah violently rejects talk of the West's using force to
break a future oil "strangulation."
.,8 6
"You cannot just frighten people and bully them around.
Ibid .
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Iran looks forward to the day when not only the Soviets,
but also the Americans are out of the Persian Gulf and the
Indian Ocean.
Finally, the Shah has doubts about Iran's position in
the wake of U.S .-U.S .S . R. detente. He foresees how a big
power agreement might overlook the interests of the smaller
power, Iran. He has stated with regard to the new under-
standings between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
Well perhaps SALT was a good thing. But one-sided
disarmament is not good. It might be said by U.S. and
Russia that they could not disarm until the lesser states
disarmed.
I would hate to see, as would Europe, the United
States disarm unilaterally. Certainly Iran does not
intend to do so. 87
While there are generally very good relations between
Iran and the U.S., there still are numerous problems. As
the number of U.S. citizens in Iran increases, so might
additional irritants.
The Shah has thrown in his lot with the West, particularly
with the U.S. A strong mutual dependency exists which should
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IV. U.S. INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF
U. S. interests in the Persian Gulf are of fairly recent
origin. They have become more important recently due to the
Middle East's becoming an extremely important oil source.
U. S. interests in the Middle East in general and in Iran
in particular "were either minimal or sporadic" before the
8 8Second World War. It wasn't until 1856 that the U.S. and
Iran signed their first treaty of Friendship and Commerce
(Appendix A). Most of America's interest in the area con-
sisted of "the activities of missionaries in the cultural and
8 9
educational sphere."
While some U.S. oilmen had moved into the Middle East in
the 1920 's, most Americans before the Second World War
90
"thought of the Middle East as the locale of the Holy Land."
In the early 20th Century the Middle East was still an
area of big power influence, i.e., Britain, Russia, and
Germany. It was not until World War II and immediately after
the war that the U.S. involved itself in Iranian affairs.
8 8Lenczowski, G. ed. , United States Interests in the
Middle East , American Enterprise Institute for Public Polisy
Research, 1968, p. 6.
89 Ibid
. , p. 11.
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. , p. 81.
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Following British and Russian occupation of Iran in 1941,
American troops entered Iran to provide logistical support
to the Soviet Union from the south.
The Russians 1 reluctance to leave Azerbaijan after the
war, their support of local separatists, and their demands
for large oil concessions from Iran provided an early insight
into the Soviets as rivals rather than allies.
Strong U.S. pressure finally encouraged the Russians to
leave.
On 21 March 1946, Harry S. Truman wrote to Stalin,
stating that the United States expected the Russians to
withdraw their forces. This was to begin within a week
and to be complete within six weeks. If this was not
done, Truman warned, he would move naval forces into the
Persian Gulf and land troops in Iran. 91
Soviet actions in Iran as well as in Turkey and Greece
had far-reaching implications. The British told the U.S. in
February 1947 they were no longer prepared to support these
countries. President Truman realized that henceforth America
would have to provide the leadership on behalf of the West.
The result was the famous Truman Doctrine which "established
the basic containment policy applicable to the Middle East
92
and to the World as a whole."
Clearly Iran's position was upheld by U.S. influence and
power. "In 1947 Iran received its initial financial aid from
from the United States in the form of a credit of $25 million
91Andrews, "The Azerbaijan Incident," p. 81.




for the purchase of arms and munitions in America." " In
1947 a U.S. military mission was established in Iran.
It was in the same time period that the U.S. initiated
the stationing of a small, three-ship naval presence in the
Persian Gulf. The Middle East Force was to be a symbol of
U.S. commitment to the area.
Our first post-World War II military presence was intro-
duced into the area in 1948 with the establishment of
our Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) . This small force
consisted of a flagship homeported at facilities made
available by the British at Bahrain, with two destroyers
periodically deployed on a rotational basis from the
Atlantic Fleet. 94
This token force, in being for over a quarter of a century
now, has served to show U.S. interest in stability for the
area.
Obviously one of the diplomatic levers available to us
is the deterrent effect of a military presence. We
believe that the modest presence we have traditionally
maintained in the Persian Gulf, supplemented as necessary
by more frequent deployments of additional naval ships,
serves that purpose. 95
The post-war years saw Iran turn inward to solve domestic
and economic problems under the protective security of the U.S.
In March 1951 the Iranian Majlis agreed to nationalize the
foreign-controlled oil industry. The vote followed the impetus
from the newly-elected Prime Minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq.
93 .Nirumand, B. , Iran, The New Imperialism in Action
,
Monthly Review Press, 1969, p. 40.
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Great Britain, who had a primary interest in the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co., successfully stopped nearly all production,
distribution, and sale of Iranian oil. Two years of economic
chaos and political struggle between Iran, Britain, Mosaddeq,
and the Shah ensued. The U.S. through W. A. Harriman acted
as a mediator between the British and the Iranians on the
oil problem. The U.S. also withheld economic aid to Iran by
request of the British during their boycott of Iranian oil.
As the situation worsened, Iran severed relations with
England. The domestic situation in Iran was equally tense.
On 19 April 1953, Mussadeq [sic] was overthrown in
a coup organized by the dismissed officers with the
active support of the C.I. A. and the U.S. military
mission. 9o
Major General Stewart, director of military assistance,
told the House Foreign Affairs Committee: 'When this crisis
came on and the thing was about to collapse, we violated
our normal criteria and among other things we did, we
provided the army immediately on an emergency basis,
blankets, boots, uniforms, electric generators, and med-
ical supplies that permitted and created an atmosphere
in which they could support the Shah... The guns that they
had in their hands, the trucks they rode in, the armored
cars that they drove through the streets, and the radio
communications that permitted their control, were all
furnished through the military defense assistance program
...had it not been for this program, a government un-
friendly to the United States probably would now be in
power.
'
Following the coup, the Shah regained a firmer control
of the Iranian government, and the U.S. resumed economic and
military aid. In 1954 an agreement on the oil problem was
96SIPRI, World Armaments and Disarmaments, SIPRI Yearbook
1971
, SIPRI, MIT Press, 1971, p. 576.
97Barnett, R.J., Intervention and Revolution, p. 228
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arrived at, including participation by U.S. oil companies;
and production was resumed.
By October 1955 Iran chose to join the U.S . -sponsored
Baghdad Pact (Middle East Treaty Organization - M.E.T.O.)
which included Great Britain and the "northern tier" states,
Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan. (See Appendix B for details of
CENTO)
U.S. jet aircraft, tanks and some small naval craft were
transferred under military assistance or aid programs. In
1959 much to the distress of the Soviets, Iran and the U.S.
signed a bilateral defense agreement. (Appendix C)
Although relations with the U.S. were secure, Iran felt
in 1962 that it could take a somewhat independent stance in
foreign policy - the "independent national policy" based on
the principles of the U.N. and on establishment of better
relations with other countries. Iran lessened tension with
the Soviet Union by refusing to allow the stationing of U.S.
missiles aimed at the Soviet Union on Iranian soil.
Although U.S. arms and aid continued, the Indo-Pakistani
war in 1965 brought about a major change in Iran's perception
of its security needs and future course of action. Iran was
amazed to find that CENTO would not come to the aid of one
of its members, Pakistan. Moreover the U.S. prohibited Iran
from transferring U.S . -supplied equipment to Iran's ally,
again Pakistan.
Significant differences in perspective existed between
Washington and Tehran concerning the function and aim of
security, i.e., domestic and regional threats, while the
U.S. refused to interpret the pact in regional terms and
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therefore did not back either side in the 1965 Indo-
Pakistani hostilities. Thereafter, when it appeared to
Tehran that the United States had done little to undo the
effects of the war or discourage a fait accompli , there
was an added incentive to build large deterrent forces. 98
These actions caused Iran to re-evaluate its dependency
and its relationship with the U. S. and the treaty organization,
The Shah's 1966 arms buy ($110 million) from the U.S.S.R. re-
flected this new evolution.
By 1967 Iran was doing well enough economically to be
declared a "developed" nation by the U.S. Congress, which then
terminated the aid programs to Iran. Military assistance
changed from mostly grants to all sales, although Iran did
receive favorable credit financing for its purchases. The
United States* high regard for Iran was shown in 1968 by the
delivery to Iran, prior even to the delivery to Israel, of
32 latest-configuration F-4 Phantom jet fighters.
Iran's high priority was influenced by her recent deal
with the Soviets and her talk of buying even more Russian
equipment. The U.S. resisted this blackmail-like "pre-emptive
selling" by refusing to guarantee the Shah $600 million in
U.S. arms over six years, beginning in 1968. The U.S. pre-
ferred to grant Iran its arms in controlled lots instead of
long-term commitments.
The Shah returned to the U.S. in 1969 to press his case
with an offer to buy $100 million in arms-a-year in return
for guaranteed Iranian oil supplies. He made good arguments,
espousing the Nixon Doctrine, but was unsuccessful.





What we need (the Shah said) is to have enough means
to be able to take care of any situation that might arise
in our region alone, because my views are that it is un-
fair and becoming impractical that every nation when in
trouble will just send a wire to Washington. 'Please
come to our help. 1 First of all, I don't know if you
can do it anymore. Secondly, it could become very embar-
rassing. Thirdly, that could lead to a confrontation
with another big power. 99
The next major arms commitment from the U.S. came at a
brief but highly eventful meeting on 21 May 1972. President
Nixon stopped overnight in Tehran on his way home to the U.S.
from a visit to Moscow. During this brief stop President
Nixon is said to have told the Shah he could buy any conven-
tional arms he wanted from the United States.
Critics have used this date as the turning point of U.S.
arms sales policy from being rational to being out of control.
They cite the fact that since that date, U.S. arms sales to
Iran have jumped seven- fold.
These large increases have prompted a review of the U.S.'s
real interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf. The official
U.S. State Department reply has been put forth by Under Secre-
tary of State J. J. Sisco as follows:
Our main policy objectives for the gulf and Arabian
Peninsula region, which we have set forth before to the
committee, have remained constant since we developed a
comprehensive policy framework in anticipation of the
termination of the special British role there in 1971.
They are:
-Support for collective security and stability in the
region by encouraging indigenous regional cooperative
efforts and orderly economic progress. Being responsive
to requests from the regional states for advice regarding
the types and quantities of military equipment and services
99
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they need to meet their defense and internal security-
needs as they perceive them, and responding on a case-by-
case basis to their requests to purchase such equipment
and services from us, have served this purpose:
-Continued access to the region's oil supplies at
reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities to meet
our needs and those of our allies;
-Encouraging the states in the area to rexolve by
peaceful means territorial and other disputes between
them and widening the channels of communications between
them;
-Expanding our diplomatic, cultural, technical, com-
mercial, and financial presence and activities; and
-Assisting oil exporters to employ their rapidly
growing incomes in a constructive way, supportive of the
international financial system. 100
While all these goals are relevent and desirable, another
body of opinion suggests that U.S. arms sales are really
slanted more towards economics and less toward ideals. Arms
sales are convenient offsets to increased oil prices and
provide much-needed employment in the U.S. economy,
A natural corollary to U.S. interests in Iran and the
Persian Gulf is its interest in the larger Indian Ocean area.
The most important U.S. goal in the Indian Ocean is free access
to the sea.
In addition, Western Europe and Japan, the two areas
of the free world of greatest importance to U.S. security,
are absolutely dependent upon oil supplies from the Middle
East, and that fact alone makes it of interest to us. The
world economy is by now so integrated that freedom of navi-
gation on the high seas and noninterference with sea lines
of communication is a matter of vital importance to all
members of the world community - even those not directly
involved.
Sisco, J.J., "U.S. Policy for the Persian Gulf," in
National Security Management
, p. 150, Bauer, T.W. , and Moulton,
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To show its concern for the concept of complete freedom
of the seas, the U.S. has been...
...augmenting from time to time, the minimal permanent
presence represented by MIDEASTFOR that we have maintained
in the area for over a quarter of a century. In our
judgement, a U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean should
contribute to a deterrence against the likelihood that
force or the threat of force might be employed by others. 102
Geographically, the Indian Ocean is a vital inter-
national body of water which must remain available to
U.S. surface traffic, commercial as well as military. 103
To secure these goals and to counter Soviet presence,
the U.S. has occasionally increased the number of Seventh
Fleet deployments to the Indian Ocean, and has also developed
a communications and naval support base on Diego Garcia.
The latter action has drawn much adverse criticism from
some littoral states as a threat to the stability of the area.
Iran and India, among others, have supported the concept of
the "Indian Ocean Peace Zone." The U.S. position has been
that
while we sympathize with the principles which motivate
some of the nations in the area to promote concepts such
as the "Indian Ocean Peace Zone," all major maritime
powers, including the United States and Soviet Union,
have been doubtful about this initiative because of its
implication that littoral states somehow have a special
right to limit or control the use of the high seas by
others. The United States has long held the view that
there must be unimpaired freedom of navigation on the
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V. OIL, ARMS, AND STABILITY
U.S. -Iranian relations and the interests of both countries
in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean come to a focus
around three major issues: oil, arms, and stability.
A. OIL
Oil is a driving force in the arms sales controversy. In
its simplest form the interdependency between U.S. arms sales
and Iranian oil could be stated as follows: the Persian Gulf
holds 75% of the world's oil reserves, and the U.S. cannot
find adequate alternate sources of supply in the near future;
defense of the region is vital to the U.S.; and U.S. arms
provide Iran with the capability to protect this oil and make
it accessible to the United States.
A supporting argument says that the U.S. sells expensive
arms to offset the imbalance of payments caused by the massive
oil purchases from the Persian Gulf states. The U.S. suffers
from unemployment and a net loss of capital growth due to the
high OPEC oil prices. Arms sales boost U.S. defense industry,
cushion unemployment, and promote friendly relations with the
OPEC countries, particularly Iran.
Paradoxically Iran is both the root and the cure for the
U.S.'s economic woes. Iran is the most price-hawkish nation
in OPEC. The high oil prices are what caused slow growth and
unemployment in the U.S. in the first place.
66

It is too early to tell whether the December 1976 split
between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the price issue will break
the power of OPEC as an effective cartel. The two-tier price
increases do provide some hope to critics of U.S. arms sales
that a weakening of OPEC will hold prices down and reduce the
U.S. need to sell arms for economic reasons.
The split in OPEC also deepens their worst fears that
the U.S. arms in Iran and Saudi Arabia might be used against
each other.
Shahram Chubin notes that the Saudi-Iranian price rivalry
has existed since 1973, but he predicts that their common
concern for regional stability will prevail.
Since the oil price increases decided by OPEC (Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries) in October and
December 197 3 a divergence in economic interest between
Saudi Arabia and Iran has been manifest. Hitherto the
political interests of the two largest states of the
Gulf littoral have converged. . . Differing economic
interests now threaten this relationship. . . .Given the
long-standing mistrust between Arab and Iranian, there
is always a danger that such economic differences might
lead to personality clashes and result in political
rivalry, but there remains nonetheless a strong political
incentive for the two countries to co-operate (or at least
contain the rivalry) in order to preserve the stability
of the region. 105
The oil question ties together two themes: U.S. dependency
on Iran as an oil source and an arms market, and Iranian-Saudi
Arabian rivalry as oil suppliers. It remains to be seen
whether the U.S. will exploit the rivalry within OPEC or will
seek alternate means to decrease its own dependency without
endangering stability in the Persian Gulf.
105Chubin, S., "Iran Between the Arab West and Asian
East," Survival , July-August 1974, p. 174.
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The two-tier price settlement also highlights a basic
point of contention between Iran and the United States,
namely the price of Iran's oil. The U.S. naturally wants
the lowest possible price. Iran wants a high price because
the country has limited oil reserves (80 million barrels)
that will be depleted in the next forty years. Iran is trying
to diversify her industrial base away from oil exporting
toward "downstream" petrochemical and other industry. To do
so Iran needs maximum cash returns from as much oil as she
can sell in the short-term.
The evolution of Iran's differences with the U.S. and
with Saudi Arabia over oil are examined below in more detail.
1. OPEC Control of Its Own Oil
An unprecedented transfer of wealth to Iran and the
oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf occurred after
the October 197 3 war. This transfer upset the world economy,
caused recession, and shifted the balance of economic power
to the Persian Gulf.
In 1960 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, or OPEC, was formed. In the 1960 's and into the
early 1970' s, oil price increases were negotiated between the
concessionary oil companies and the host country.
OPEC countries had not gained the power to unilaterally
declare price increases. They negotiated with the oil companies




There followed a move toward collective OPEC nego-
tiations with the companies; and finally by 1973, unilateral
OPEC declaration of increased prices.
In 1968 the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries, OAPEC, was formed, consisting of Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Libya. 1968 was one year after the 1967 six-day
Arab-Israeli war. The Arab countries were forming together
to use. oil as a political weapon against Israel, as well as
against her Western suppliers.
The control of oil by the exporting countries was
spurred on by the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran was conspic-
uously absent from the new group, OAPEC, being non-Arab and
pro-U.S. Iran would later reap the benefits, however, of
the Arab move to control the price and destination of OPEC
oil.
In the early 1970 's Libya carried on a three-pronged
attack on her Western oil companies. Libya employed oil
production cutbacks, punitive nationalization of the oil
companies, and unilateral price boosts.
The other OPEC countries, with the exception of Iraq,
followed Libya's initiatives with more moderate means. They
nationalized their oil companies through negotiations which
allowed the companies to stay in the country, manage the
industry, and earn a reasonable profit.
A landmark in the takeover process was the Tehran
Agreement of 14 February 1971. Six Gulf states increased
the tax on the oil companies' exports by 55%, and negotiated
a 35C-per-barrel price increase.
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Two similar agreements followed shortly thereafter:
the Tripoli Agreement, negotiated bilaterally by Libya on
2 April 1971 for a 90C-per-barrel increase; and the Eastern
Mediterranean Agreement the same month, which increased the
posted price by 81C.
More negotiated price increases resulted from the
Geneva Agreement of January 1972. In May 1973 Iran fully
nationalized her oil assets and concluded a 20-year agree-
ment with the international oil consortium on production
levels and prices.
The Second Geneva Agreement of June 1973 was the
last negotiated price increase for the OPEC states. Follow-
ing the October 197 3 Arab-Israeli War, OPEC concluded the
Tehran Agreement on 22 December. This landmark agreement
began the era of unilateral price-increase declarations by
OPEC.
The first leap was enormous. The price of a barrel
of light Saudi crude rose from $3.65/bbl. to $8.30 in
10 6
January 1974, and to $10.46 the following November.
2. U.S. Dependency on OPEC oil
While OPEC and Iran were taking over their oil assets,
the U.S. was becoming more and more dependent on that oil.
In 1971-1972 the U.S. no longer had surplus oil to export,
and in fact became a net importer of oil.
10 6
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Oil imports by the U.S. rose from 3.4 million b.p.d.
in 1970 to an estimated 8.3 million b.p.d. in 1977. The
107
share was estimated to be 46.1%. The oil from the Alaskan
pipeline was predicted to be too expensive to totally relieve
10 8
the U.S. dependence on the Persian Gulf.
Two months after OPEC ' s drastic price increases of
December 1973, the International Energy Agency was formed
in Washington, D.C., as a collective oil-consumer agency.
It opposed bilateral negotiations with OPEC such as those
undertaken individually by France and Great Britain to assure
themselves of oil. Collective bargaining thus formed on
both the supplier and consumer sides of the oil issue.
In 1974 the so-called "oil crisis" occurred in the
United States. The long gasoline lines brought home to the
U.S. citizen his dependence on Persian Gulf oil.
1974 was an adjustment period for the U.S. It was
a time to balance national policy toward OPEC between talk
of reconciliation and threats of outright military inter-
109
vention.
President Ford sued Iran for lower oil prices in
September. The Shah of Iran figuratively waved the finger
back and scolded the President for dictating policy to Iran.
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The Shah added, however, that it was beneficial for Iran to
stay on good terms with the U.S. because of the U.S. 's nuclear
arsenal. He presumably viewed the U.S.'s strategic forces
as the ultimate insurance against Iran's survival.
By the same token that Iran was eager to stay on
good terms with the U.S., so was the United States intent on
maintaining good relations with Iran and OPEC. The Persian
Gulf appeared at that time to be the only area with enough
oil reserves to supply the West on a long-term basis.
3 . Iranian Arms Orders, Foreign Aid, and Development
Having stabilized relations with the U.S., Iran
launched programs of military purchases, foreign aid, and
internal development. Iran's goal was to rapidly establish
herself as a great power. Beginning in 1974 Iran invested
her vastly-increased oil revenues in the symbols of great
power status: an impressive military, dynamic foreign re-
lations, and an industrial base.
The Shah began in March, 1974 by ordering thirty U.S.
F-14's, the most advanced fighter in the world at that time.
In June he ordered fifty more, and in September concluded
an additional $4-billion deal with the U.S. for military
equipment.
Iran began its diplomatic campaign in April, 1974
when a large number of foreign dignitaries visited Iran and
signed aid and trade agreements.
"Shah Rejects Bid By Ford For Cut in Prices of Oil,"
The New York Times , 27 September 1974, p. 1.
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Iran arranged to supply Afghanistan with 40% of her
oil needs, and agreed to supply oil to Pakistan on friendly
terms. Indira Ghandi also made a personal visit in spite of
the Shah's support for her enemy, Pakistan. The two leaders
held friendly discussions on trade between India and Iran.
Turkey, Morocco, Syria, and Egypt were other visitors
to Iran during this period. Iran gave Egypt $850 million in
aid and investments in petrochemicals, paper-processing, and
a Suez-Mediterranean pipeline. The latter would allow super-
tankers to avoid the costly trip around the Cape of Good
Hope, and would also provide Iran a free-zone port on the
Mediterranean. Iran also provided Egypt with military aid
and training.
Iran undertook other African ventures. A project in
Senegal included a refinery, a petrochemical plant, a phos-
phate plant, and port facilities. Developments in Chad
Kenya, and Zaire were also considered.
In March 1975 Iran agreed to build a $200 million
fertilizer plant in Indonesia. Other contracts that year
included a five-year deal for cement, steel, and fertilizer
from North Korea, and skilled labor from South Korea and
the Philippines. Iran promised to finance mining, industry,
and agriculture in Australia. In November 1975 Iran con-
tracted with Japan to build a $1 billion petrochemical plant
on the Persian Gulf.
Iran was opening new contacts through these financial
deals with countries outside the U.S. and Western Europe.
Iran was decreasing her dependency on the West and opening
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new options in foreign policy. She continued, however, to
draw upon Europe and the U.S. for the transfer of technology
and skills to Iran.
In 1974 Iran concluded multi-billion-dollar package
deals with Italy, France, Great Britain, and the United States
for industrial goods and services. Iran purchased 25% interest
in Germany's Krupp Steel to obtain its steel technology. Iran
bargained with France for a uranium-enrichment plant, and
bargained with U.S. for eight nuclear power plants. Iran
also negotiated with the Soviet Union for $3-billion-worth
of joint ventures and $2.5 billion in trade over the next
five years.
4 . Deficit Spending, Cutbacks, and Barter
By 1975, however, the boom-demand for Iran's oil sub-
sided due to world-wide economic slowdown. Iran found itself
in a pinch between lower demands from the oil consortium,
underselling by Saudi Arabia, and inflated prices of foreign
imports.
In July 1975 the Shah announced a $3 billion deficit
and began borrowing money abroad. In February 1976 Iran
secured a $50 million loan from an international bank syndi-
cate and lowered the price of crude oil by 9.5C/bbl. to boost
112
sales. Iran expected a $2.4 billion deficit for the year
"Iranian Deficit Totals $4 Billion; Loans Asked," The
Wall Street Journal , 28 July 1975, p. 7.
112
"A $50 Million Loan Is Granted To Iran," The New York
Times, 18 February 1976, p. 59.
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beginning in March. Real economic growth was expected to
drop to 17% from the 1974- '75 high of 42%. 113
Reductions in Iran's defense spending appeared in
February, 1976. General Toufanian, Iranian Vice-minister
of War in charge of arms purchases, cabled U.S. Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld that the U.S. should lower its weapons
prices and induce its oil companies to increase oil produc-
tion in Iran. Otherwise, he said, Iran would shop elsewhere
for arms.
*
Iran cancelled its plans that same month to add
40 F-14's to the existing order of 80. The planes' $122
million unit price was considered too high. Iran turned its
attention to the F-16 because of its lower unit price.
By January 1977, however, inflation had also driven
higher the cost of the F-16. The original $2.1 billion cost
for 300 F-16's had risen to $3.8 billion for only 160 of the
same airplane. General Toufanian charged that the cost was
inflated by the U.S. contractors' desires for excessive
profits. He also complained that Iran was being charged
$27.3 million-per-aircraft, while NATO would pay only $6.4
million apiece. The U.S. replied that Iran's figure included
115parts and support.
113Pace, Eric. "Cut in Iran Oil Revenues Forces a Budget
Deficit," The New York Times
,
4 February 1976, p. 1.
114
Finney, J.W. , "Iran May Reduce U.S. Army Buying," The
New York Times , 4 February 1976, p. 7.
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"Israel, Iran Could Add 410 F-16 Orders Soon," Armed
Forces Journal, January 1977, p. 15.
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Iran also cancelled orders for two of six Spruance
destroyers in 1976. The 1974 unit price of $234 million had
116increased to $338 million by February, 1976.
The more Iran felt the economic pinch in 1976, the
more she tried to guarantee herself markets for her oil.
Iran attempted to buy heavily into two U.S. oil companies,
Ashland and Occidental, and create an assured U.S. market;
but both deals fell through.
The financial squeeze also forced Iran toward barter-
ing her oil for arms and other needs. In August 1976, Sec-
retary of State Kissinger negotiated in Tehran for a $13
117billion arms-for-oil barter deal, including possible
118
acquisition of F-16, F-18, and AWACS aircraft.
The effect of the oil market contraction in 1975- '76
was to turn Iran "inward to domestic economic development
and away from the ambitious foreign aid, overseas investments,
119
and influence-building as a regional military power."
5. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Two-Tier Pricing
Beginning in October 1974, the Saudi Arabian oil
minister, Sheik Yamani, linked his moderate oil price increases
116
Finney, "Iran May Reduce," p. 7.
117
"Iran," Middle East Economic Digest , 13 August 1976,
pp. 15, 16.
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,
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,
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with Saudi Arabia's hope for an Arab-Israeli peace settle-
120
ment. At the October 1976 Arab summit conference Sheik
Yamani expressed hope that the new Carter Administration, if
elected, would show appreciation for lower price increases
121by settling the Israeli question favorably for the Arabs.
In December 1976 a two-tier price system was adopted
by OPEC in which Saudi Arabia held out for a moderate 5%
increase and Iran adopted an immediate 10% increase with an
added 5% expected in July 1977.
Iran was disturbed by the Saudis' strategy. The
world would flock to Saudi Arabia for its cheaper oil, and
Iran's oil income would continue to fall. Iran desperately
needed the cash, while Saudi Arabia already had more than
it could spend.
Basically, Saudi Arabia, with the world's largest oil
reserves and a population of between five and six million,
has little incentive to seek a rapid increase in revenues
for development and has thus taken the view that the price
of oil should not rise too steeply or too quickly. Her
interest is best served by maintaining the price of oil
at a level where it is marginally competitive with alter-
native sources of energy, and she is thus pursuing a
strategy of maximizing her revenues over the long run.
Iran, with a much larger population, much smaller reserves,
and a thirst for revenues with which to finance her devel-
opment projects ,' has adopted a strategy of maximizing her
revenues in the short run by raising oil prices, whether
or not this may have an adverse effect on the demand for
oil in the long run. 122
°"Saudi Ties Oil Price Cut to Political Stability,"
The New York Times , 3 October 1974, p. 3.
121
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The Shah's regime is in many ways ultraconservative,
rigorously restraining radical dissent, but it also pur-
sues ambitious social goals such as rapid improvement
in housing for Iran's 34 million people and diversified
industrial development.
But pursuing these various aims is costly, and it
is putting Iran in the unenviable position of having to
borrow abroad to make up a financial deficit, while other
Middle Eastern oil nations, blessed with far smaller
populations, are piling up huge financial reserves. 123
The biggest losers from the price increases were the
lesser-developed countries, whose energy costs continued to
124
rise in spite of support from the OPEC aid fund. Iran
was also less able to support such countries in 1977 than
she had been in 1974. In an interview with Business Week
the Shah predicted hightened instability and lessened hopes
for peace in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean as a
result.
What will be the impact of Saudi Arabia ' s holding its
price rise to just 5%?
The question now is whether Yamani will flood the
market with oil. If he does this, for a little while
it may force us to decrease our production. And if this
happens it will affect our economic plans, our military
buildup, and especially our foreign aid programs. Remem-
ber that if we aid foreign countries, our neighbors, it
is to have more stability in the region. We aim at
having a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. If we have
to cut our oil production and our income suffers, then
we will have to drop this policy. Is that in the world's
best interest?125
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In conclusion the oil issue is an important area
where Iranian and U.S. interests are at odds. Iran's short-
term interests in establishing a military-industrial base
dictate her policy of high oil prices. High prices run
counter to U.S. concern for a long-term supply of oil at a
reasonable cost. As will be seen in the following section,
the United States is constrained in its ability to use arms
sales as an effective lever to influence Iran's oil policy.
B. ARMS
In 1952 the U.S. tried and failed to solve the oil dis-
pute with Mosaddeq by boycotting arms to Iran. An arms
embargo would probably be as ineffective today as it was then
to dictate oil policy to Iran.
The trend in U.S. arms transfers to Iran has in fact led
away from arms as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy - the
hegemonic pattern - toward arms as an extension of domestic
and international economics - the industrial pattern. In the
latter pattern the foreign policy aspect of arms transfers
is not lost, but is overshadowed by the economic aspects.
1 . Hegemonic Supply Pattern
The period 1950 to 1972 may be broadly described as
hegemonic. Within this time period there emerged two sub-
patterns: monopolistic supply, 1950-1966; and pre-emptive
supply, 1966-1972.
a. Monopolistic Supply
In 1950 the United States, Great Britain, and
France signed a Tripartite Agreement, creating the Near
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Eastern Arms Coordinating Committee, and organizing rough
parity as arms suppliers. The West had a monopoly on arms
supply to the Middle East, and the U.S. virtually monopolized
supply to Iran.
The main rationale for U.S. arms supply to Iran,
as well as to the other "forward Defense" areas, Turkey and
Greece, was to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union.
More specifically Iran's armed forces were conceived of as
substitutes for U.S. troops that would otherwise have to be
127
stationed in Iran to do the same job.
The military aid to the forward defense areas
presupposed mutual anti-Soviet interests with the client
state, Iran. To receive the aid, Iran had to pledge alleg-
iance to these interests. She did so by agreeing to the
128
Mutual Security Act of 1951, and by joining CENTO in 1955.
It is reasonable to assume that Iran was genu-
inely concerned about deterring any renewed Soviet aggres-
sion. The Azerbaijan incident was still fresh in the Shah's
mind. Iran may have been even more concerned with her other
neighbors than with the Soviets, particularly after 1958 and
the coup in Iraq. Nonetheless Iran agreed to the American
126
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terms, for her primary interest was to obtain military
equipment.
In the early 1960 's the U.S. again used arms
supplies as an instrument of foreign policy. The U.S. influ-
enced Iran's social development by limiting arms aid and in-
creasing economic aid.
Under President Kennedy's "flexible response"
doctrine, the U.S. promised to supply troops if need be to
protect countries against external communist aggression.
The arms supplies to Iran were limited to so-called "counter-
insurgency" weapons. Economic aid was supplied to combat
local poverty, which Defense Secretary McNamara propounded
129
as the seedbed of revolution.
In 1961 the Shah was slow to institute much-needed
land reforms in Iran. The U.S. disapproved of the slow pro-
gress by ending the $30 million annual aid to the Iranian
Army in July, 1962. The Shah announced his "White Revolution"
in January 1963, reopened the Majles by October, and received
America's blessing of $200 million in arms credit in June,
1964. 130
b. Pre-emptive Supply
Iran broke out of the U.S.'s monopolistic supply
pattern in 1966 by ordering $110 million of non-sensitive
129 Ibid
. , p. 155
.
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military equipment - mainly armored personnel carriers and
trucks - from the Soviet Union.
The Soviet-Iranian arms deal of 1966 reflected the Shah's
interest in acquiring the support of progressive urban
groups in connection with his land reform programme, and
in strengthening his bargaining position with the U.S.
in various disputes concerning oil and the U.S. reluctance
to increase arms supplies. 131
The U.S. Congress viewed Iran as an unreliable
ally as a result of the sale. Congress declared Iran a
"developed country" in November 1967, terminated economic
aid, and initiated the end of grant military aid.
The Departments of State and Defense, however,
were eager to block the Soviets from gaining further influence
in Iran through their arms sales. The fighting in Yemen,
the Arab oil claims against Iran, and the imminent withdrawal
of the British from the Persian Gulf pointed to the need for
Iran to become the new policeman for the area.
The Administration intended to pre-empt further
Soviet sales by supplying Iran with its arms needs. In order
to bypass Congressional control over renewed arms grants, the
Administration switched its policy from grants to arms sales.
The so-called "X-country" loans from the Export-Import Bank
to the Department of Defense for Iranian arms credits cut
Congress out of the control process in 1966-' 67.
Congress countered with the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1967, and the 1968 Amendments which ended the revolving
SIPRI, The Arms Trade, p. 63
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credit fund in the Export- Import Bank and placed dollar
ceilings on foreign arms assistance.
The British announced in 1968 that they would
withdraw their forces from the Persian Gulf by 1971. During
the ensuing three years, 1968- * 71, the U.S. and Great Britain
sold Iran enough equipment to build a credible defensive
force so that Iran could assume Britain's active role in the
132Persian Gulf. The main components of this force are listed
in Appendix E.
2. Industrial Supply Pattern
Iran had a reasonably-balanced military force struc-
ture by the end of 1973, but events in October through Decem-
ber 1973 suddenly changed the picture of U.S. arms sales to
Iran from "reasonable" to "out of control." The October 1973
War demonstrated the swiftness with which the Arab and Israeli
weapons stockpiles were depleted as well as the massive de-
pendence of the two sides on resupply from the U.S. and the
Soviet Union. Iran's enormous arms orders beginning in early
1974 may well appear "out of control" to U.S. eyes. They
may also reflect, however, the Shah's desire to have ample
weapons and replacements on-hand to diminish his dependence
on U.S. support.
The quantum leap in Iran's oil revenues in 1974 made
Iran's purchases possible. The U.S. could no longer exert
influence over Iran by limiting its credit or restricting
132Szulc, Tad. "U.S. Britain Quietly Back Military Build-
up in Iran," The New York Times , 25 July 1971, p. 1.
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the size of its purchases. The United States in effect had
to sell arms to Iran or else lose the market and all of its
potential influence in Iran to West European exporters, or
to the Soviet Union
Faced with this dilemma the Nixon Administration
decided to maximize the economic benefits of foreign arms
sales. December 197 3 was the turning point in the transition
from a hegemonic to an industrial' supply pattern of U.S. arms
to Iran.
The predominant factor in the booming [arms] business
seems to be a directive by President Nixon on December
20, 1973, creating an inter-departmental committee to
spur exports, including arms sales, for balance-of-
payment reasons. 133
a. Dependence of Iran on the U.S.
Under the industrial supply pattern Iran became
less dependent on the U.S. and other suppliers for sheer
numbers of tanks, missiles, airplanes, and ships. Iran did
incur, however, a new kind of dependence as a result of the
"back-end" effects of her arms contracts.
After the sales contract has been signed, the entire
spectrum of military operations - procurement, finance,
logistics, maintenance, and training - may continue for
ten or more years. 134
Iran lacked the trained manpower to accept and
absorb her new weapons immediately. It appeared that Iran's
133
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military forces would not become operationally independent
of the U.S. for at least a decade.
It is likely that a support force of Grumman
employees will remain in Iran as long as the F-14 remains in
135
service there, possibly into the 1990 's.
Project Peace Log - a modern logistics system for
Iran - would employ 460 Americans to train 14,000 Iranians
by 1981. Due to shortages of eligible trainees, however, the
U.S. personnel were "likely to be involved for a long period
* ,_• ,,136of time.
Thirty-seven Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile
batteries - the "largest and most complex of all systems"
in Iran - were supposed to be manned and supported by 12,000
Iranians by 19 81. It was estimated, however, that they would
fall short of 2500 people by 1978/' 79 for lack of training,
construction, proper logistics, and qualified students. The
system would not be fully-operational and independent of U.S.
137
support until the mid-1980 's.
Iranian Army Aviation had a training and mainte-
nance program for its Bell helicopters, which was designed
to be completed by 1978. Due to problems of social adaptation
among U.S. instructor-pilots and lack of Iranian automatic
135Wetmore, W.C., "Iranians Trained in U.S. For F-14
Support," Aviation Week and Space Technology , 1 December
1975, p. 56.
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data processing skills, the U.S. would remain involved in
138
the program "well into the 19 80 *s.
The Spruance-class destroyer was designed for
initial delivery in 1980/ ' 81. Training of Iranian crews
slipped behind schedule in the U.S. , and Iran suspended con-
struction of the Spruances ' support facilities at Chah Bahar
due to money constraints. The port would take five to seven
years to complete once renewed. The Spruances would not be-
139
come fully operational until the mid-to-late 19 80 's.
Due to recruitment and training difficulties, the
operation of Iran's three Tang-class U.S. submarines and her
six RH-53D ASW helicopters faced delays into the 1980' s "in
140
all aspects except equipment delivery."
The major conclusion of a July 1976 Senate staff
study on U.S. military sales to Iran was that
...it is unlikely that Iran could go to war in the next
five to ten years with its current and prospective inven-
tory, i . e. ... sophisticated weapons ,.. .without U.S. support
on a day-to-day basis. 141
b. Domestic Arms Industry
Iran will eventually reduce her dependence on the
U.S. for weapons and logistic support by establishing her
own domestic arms industry. The following are examples of













The 1976 deal with Great Britain for Rapier
surface-to-air missiles provided for Iranian assembly of the
missiles initially, and for eventual Iranian production of
the Rapier.
Hughes Aircraft Co. and Westinghouse were building
an electronics industrial center near Shiraz for eventual
operation by the Iranian Electronics Industry. The Center
would include repair, test, and eventually manufacturing
143
capabilities for the TOW anti-tank missile.
The August 1973 sale of 2500 Maverick TV-guided
air-to-ground missiles to the Iranian Air Force included pro-
visions for "future participation by Iranian industry in
144future Hughes missile development projects."
Iranian Vice-minister of War, General Toufanian,
announced Iran's desire to have a tank-manufacturing capa-
bility, beginning with parts manufacture, progressing to
overhaul and maintenance, and finally to production capa-
bilities. The most likely choice as co-producer was Great
145Britain who already supplied Iran with Chieftan tanks.
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Aviation Week reported that the "Iranian navy
expects to have an independent logistics and maintenance
capability in the early 1980 's for the 6 Sikorsky RH-53D
146
minesweeping helicopters it has purchased."
In summary Iran will have some capability in the
near future to manufacture fighter aircraft, helicopters,
advanced computer terminal products, electro-optical products,
and surface-to-air missiles. It should also have a ship-
building capability for small warships within the next five
147years.
c. Benefits to U.S. of the Industrial Pattern
Foreign military sales are credited with lowering
U.S. production costs, and at times with determining if a
production line continues or closes.
In December 1974, for example, Iran offered to
148fully back the resumed output of the C-5A. Iran's purchase
of ten Boeing AWACS planes was hoped for in December 1975 in
149
order to keep that production line open. In 1976 Iran
authorized the United States to incur $8 million-worth of
expenses to "help work along" on the land-based version of
146Aviation Week and Space Technology , 16 August 1976, p. 11
147Defense Marketing Services (DMS) , Foreign Military
Markets; Middle East/Africa, Iran Summary
, p. 146, DMS, 1976.
148Witkin, R. , "Iran Offers to Fully Back Resumed Output
of C-5A's," The New York Times , 2 December 1974, p. 1.
149Finney, J.W. , "U.S. Offers Iran 10 Of Its Costliest




the F-18 fighter. Iran's 1974 loan to Grumman of $75
million to bolster the F-14's production has been widely
., . . , 151publicized.
U.S. employment also benefited from military sales
to Iran. It was estimated that every $1 billion in foreign
arms sales paid for 30,000 directly-related jobs and 60,000
152
support jobs in the U.S. By January 1977 export sales
were said to compose 45% of total U.S. aerospace shipments,
153
representing 170,000 full-time jobs.
d. Costs to the U.S. of the Industrial Pattern
In spite of the substantial benefits of arms
sales to Iran, these sales have also incurred costs to the
U.S. The costs include depletion of critical skills from
the U.S. Armed Forces, transfer of sensitive technology and
intelligence to Iran, third country transfer of U.S. weapons,
and potential entanglement in future conflicts through
"hostage" U.S. employees in Iran.
A General Accounting Office study in 1975 stated
that "U.S. arms sales to Iran were beginning to impose a
15
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drain on critical skills needed by the U.S. 's own armed
154forces." The same study reported that of 53 Air Force
specialist ratings supplied to Iran, 24 were in short supply
in U.S. forces. The same was true for 34 of 69 U.S. Army
specialist skills.
A 1976 Senate staff study cited depletions in
U.S. arms inventories to fill foreign sales orders. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff believed these depletions adversely
affected U.S. force readiness. The fact that Foreign Military
Sales clients such as Iran were made part of the U.S. logistics
system was also believed to strain U.S. resupply of its own
155forces.
Defense Secretary Schlesinger even felt it neces-
sary to establish a $300 million "inventory replenishment
fund" in 1975. The purpose of the fund was to stockpile
planes, tanks, missiles, and parts in excess to anticipate
sudden foreign demand for them.
Sales to Iran also held the potential for draining
U.S. technology and intelligence. Iran signed a contract with
Rockwell International in 1975 to build the "IBEX" system,
a complex electronics and communications-gathering intelli-
gence system. Iran intended to hire ex-U.S. National Security
154Pace, Eric. "U.S. Influence on Iran: Gigantic and
Diverse," The New York Times , 30 August 1976, p. 9.
155
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"Congress Takes Aim At Mid East Arms Sales," Business
Week
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Agency and Air Force Security Service personnel to man the
system. The deal was criticized not only as a transfer of
advanced U.S. technology, but as a potential compromise of
157
U.S. intelligence expertise.
Iran could become an arms supplier in its own
right, a development that would take arms control in the
Middle East one step farther from U.S. hands. Although Iran
has abided by U.S. restrictions against transferring arms to
third countries, Iran has begun such transfers on a limited
basis subject to U.S. approval. In January and March 197 5
Iran obtained approval to transfer 36 F-5A's to Jordan and
158
50 F-5A's to Pakistan. In May 1976 Iran sought permission
to transfer 26 F-5A's, 36 recoilless rifles, and 15 155mm
159howitzers to Morocco via Jordan.
Finally the increasing number of U.S. personnel
working in defense-related jobs inside Iran implies a pro-
portionate risk of U.S. entanglement in a future armed con-
flect between Iran and a third country. In 1976 an estimated
1,435 D.O.D. personnel, 1,941 dependents, 2,941 civilian con-
tractor personnel, and 27,000 U.S. citizens were in Iran.
The estimate for 1980 was 50,000-60,000 U.S. personnel in Iran.
157Hersh, S.M. , "Iran Signs Rockwell Deal for Persian
Gulf Spy Base," The New York Times , 1 June 1975, p. 1.
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Given the heavy dependence of Iran's military forces on U.S.
technicians, evacuation of all U.S. citizens from Iran in
time of crisis would be tantamount to abandoning Iran as an
ally.
e. U.S. Arms Sales Legislation
The real costs and potential risks of arms sales
to Iran were prominent enough in 1976 to prompt Congress to
enact controlling legislation. President Ford vetoed the
first bill in May which would have brought commercial sales
over $25 million under Congressional scrutiny. The main
reason for the veto was a $9 billion annual ceiling on total
U.S. foreign arms sales.
The President did sign a second bill in June which
excluded the $9 billion ceiling, but did include a $5.6
billion foreign aid ceiling for Fiscal Year 1976 and a 27-
month $6.9 billion International Security Assistance Author-
ization Bill. The bill placed "unprecedented reporting
requirements" on the President, concerning the impact of the
i
161
arms sales on each country.
The State Department was also said to be planning
international traf fic-in-arms regulations to require prior
government approval of export sales of "significant combat
equipment," and to block "salesmanship" of arms in foreign
countries. Hopefully this would diminish the risk of offense
161
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to friendly governments from an ultimate negative decision
on an arms sales request.
f. Diversification of Supplier
Although Congressional restrictions on arms sales
to Iran have been relatively mild, they could conceivably
become so restrictive in the future that Iran would turn to
other suppliers for its major defense needs. The $600 million
Rapier missiles-for-oil deal with the British in August, 1976
was "timed in part to underscore the fact that Iran can buy
weapons from West European countries if it is ever snubbed
163by the United States, now the main arms supplier."
The Shah's reaction to the U.S. Senate staff
study which criticized U.S. sales to Iran was as follows:
'We are the only judge of what we need or not, ' he
added. 'If you supply us with what we need, O.K., we
are happy.' However, he went on, if American supplies
were restricted, 'there are many more sources available
in the world just waiting for the moment for us to go
and shop there in their shops.' 164
The Shah's willingness to shop elsewhere also
impinges on the subject of nuclear proliferation in Iran.
The U.S. has been willing to sell Iran nuclear power plants,
but not nuclear reprocessing plants which convert nuclear
wastes into reuseable fuel. The ability to manufacture the
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fuel would also give Iran the ability to manufacture nuclear
weapons. Although the Shah has protested his peaceful in-
tentions to use his nuclear plants for commercial versus
military purposes, he is reported to be seeking raw uranium
from South Africa and a reprocessing plant from West Germany.
Pakistan was said to have approached France for a similar
plant, and Saudi Arabia"was scrambling to begin a nuclear
r .. ,,165program of its own.
g. Summary
U.S. arms sales to Iran were given free reign
from 1972 until 1975. At that time Iran reduced its orders
somewhat as the effects of inflation in the West and lower
oil revenues began to be felt. Members of the U.S. Congress
studied the adverse effects of the sales on U.S. forces and
the possibilities for undesirable entanglement in Iran. Tighter
Congressional controls on foreign and commercial sales were
imposed in 1976. The Shah repeated his intent to diversify
his arms suppliers if need be, even in the realm of nuclear
energy.
C. STABILITY
Probably the most sensitive issue raised by arms transfers
to Iran is that of stability. The determination of the de-
stabilizing effects of a particular arms transfer to any
country or area is a difficult question.
1 cr
"Now An A-Bomb for the Shah," San Francisco Chronicle
,
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There is the problem of defining stability, then of meas-
uring it, and finally of ascertaining cause and effect or
action-reaction relationships.
In applying this process to Iran, three broad topic areas
lend themselves to investigation: 1) Iran's internal stability,
2) Iran's regional relations with regional states, and 3)
Iran's expanding diplomatic and economic efforts.
1. Iran's Internal Stability
The present Iranian government takes much pride in
its long 2500-year existence as a sovereign state, and even
at times as an empire. Iran's sovereignty has, however, been
challenged periodically from within as well as from without.
...the Government of Iran has faced during the past 30
years strong opposition from an extreme leftist movement,
tied in various ways to the outside, and opposition from
the indigenous, extremely traditional forces who resent
change and modernity . 166
Iranian internal security measures reflect the Shah's
desire to change Iran from a backward traditional society
into a modern industrial one. The Shah's plans are vast.
...in 13 years we will be where West Europe is today.
Within 25 years, all told, we will catch up with Europe
as it then is. Economically. We may be more advanced
socially. 167
The plans include vast social welfare programs to
increase the low literacy rate, provide better health and
1
Atherton, A.L., "Department Testifies on Human Rights
in Iran," U.S. Department of State Bulletin , 4 October 1976,
p. 433.
167Sulzberger, C.L., "The Shah (II): Authority," The
New York Times , 22 March 1975, p. 31.
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education programs, and to generally improve the standard of
living. The government already subsidizes basic food staples
for lower-paid workers.
More active participation in government, land reform
and mass-ownership of businesses is being stressed. The Shah
has little use for critics of his plans for Iran's future.
The Shah himself is even blunter: 'We want to catch up
and do it quickly. In these very specific conditions,
the blah-blahs of armchair critics are obviously ignored.
If this is intolerance, I accept it. '168
This development can be paid for by current revenues
from oil sales. The development is time-critical because
in 25 to 30 years the oil reserves will be depleted. To
keep his plans on schedule the Shah has imposed radical
measures which have aroused opposition from conservative
and radical elements alike.
In Iran the large landholders and the leaders of large
tribal groups have seen the bases of their strength
severely eroded by land reform and the other reforms
which I previously mentioned. The religiously conserva-
tive elements in the society, powerful in varying degrees
in all Moslem countries, have at times vigorously opposed
the whole process of modernization, which they consider
to be sectarian and anti-Islamic. 169
The Shah is not changing things rapidly enough for
leftist-oriented groups, some of whom have opposed him with
outright violence. Assassination attempts on the Shah have
failed or been thwarted, but Iranian government officials
16 8
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and U.S. military and technical advisors have fallen victim
to the terrorists. In August 1976 three U.S. employees of
Rockwell International - builder of the "IBEX" system - were
170killed in Tehran by "Islamic-Marxist" gunmen.
Physical security is provided in Iran by a significant
national police force, the 700,000-man Gendarmerie, and by
a security apparatus, the SAVAK.
Prime Minister Hoveida has stated the reason for
these security requirements: "The survival of the state can-
171
not come about with a permissive society."
The Shah has stated: "Our society, to achieve its
172goals, must remain based on discipline."
The Shah places the blame for instability in Iran
squarely on communists, and by inference, on the Soviet Union.
My only opponents are the Communists. Against them the
law prevails. 173
What is happening in my country is that Communism is
prohibited because they are people who have sworn alle-
giance to our flag and allegiance to some other country. 174
170Woodward, B., "Murder, Intrigue Mark Secret Projects
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Two more important issues that impinge upon Iran's
internal stability are the questions of human rights and of
the Shah's succession.
a. Human Rights
Internal security is so tight and all-pervasive
that it has left Iran with a bad record of alleged human
rights violations. U.S. support to the Shah through arms
sales has drawn much criticism precisely because of the human
rights issue. In connection with human rights in the recipient
country, arms sales become a moral issue for the supplier
nation.
The Shah has bluntly pointed out to Americans the
different outlooks of their two countries as he sees them.
Our approach to the meaning of the word 'freedom' in our
two languages is different... What suits you may be right
for you, and if you are happy with it, keep it. But don't
judge us by your standards. If we are happy with what we
have, we are going to keep it and we are not going to
obliterate it just to please you. 175
His wife, Empress Farah, also provides some
reasons for the present form of government.
We had a very weak leadership and the country was coming
apart. There were so many parties, so many politicians.
It was really a mess. Now, after 30 years, we have strong
leadership. . .We have a challenge from the world to see if
a monarchy of this kind works - a monarchy that makes a
revolution from the top and introduces social laws that
don't exist in other countries - land reform, laws for
women's rights, laws for factory workers. 176
1750akes, "Shah is Offering," p. 8.
1 7 fi
Interview With Empress Farah, San Francisco Examiner
and Chronicle, 26 September 1975, p. 3.
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There is disagreement in Iran with the Shah's
arguments, and particularly vociferous opposition from Iran-
ian students abroad - many of them in the United States -
who consider the Shah a despot and condemn the U.S. for sup-
porting him.
The U.S. supports many other countries, however,
which also have less than ideal human rights situations.
Singling out Iran on this issue is a delicate operation.
Even the United Nations had a hard time doing so.
The human rights situation in Iran was considered by
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1975. The Com-
mission members determined that there was not sufficient
evidence presented to the Commission on which to base
further action. The Commission adopted the following
consensus decision: 'The Commission decides that in the
case of Iran, no action is called for under (Economic
and Social) Council resolution 1503. '177
Recent Carter Administration decisions to curtail
aid or military sales on the basis of human rights evaluations
have brought strong negative reactions from long-time friends
of the U.S. Charges of "selective morality" have been levied
at the U.S.
The U.S., if it persists in the effort, will find
the role of moral policeman to the world as difficult,
thankless and perhaps even as dangerous as the role of
military policeman that it has just renounced.
A U.S. State Department official stated in 1976
that human rights should be "a matter of internal Iranian
177Atherton, "Department Testifies," p. 436.
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responsibility and that one sovereign country should not
179interfere lightly in another's domestic affairs."
In conclusion the human rights issue could affect
Iran's internal stability in two ways: 1) violations could
become so flagrant and oppressive as to cause increased urban
terrorism - an unlikely development in the near future, and
2) significant reductions in U.S. arms sales and support due
to human rights violations would seriously impair Iran's
war-waging capability. Such reductions, if significant,
would also be a signal to opposition elements in Iran of de-
creased U.S. approval of the Shah's regime. Such a vote of
no confidence could increase political instability in Iran,
b. The Shah's Succession
Another issue affecting Iran's internal stability
is the question of the Shah's succession. The Shah is a prime
target for any group that wishes to alter the form of govern-
ment, because so much of the decision-making process is vested
in the Shah alone. Iran has in fact been described as a "one
bullet" country, one bullet away from a completely different
political orientation.
In the event of the Shah's untimely demise, one
wonders whether his modern military equipment would fall into
the hands of a new domestic regime or of an outside power
that opposes the United States. The same conjecture was
made in the case of South Vietnam, although the predicted





Barring such dire events, the Shah has publicly
stated that he hopes to rule for 10 to 15 more years, and to
see his developments well underway before he turns control
over to son, Crown Prince Reza. The Shah added that he would
not disappear, but would be "in the wings" to assist Reza,
180
who "would be older than I was when I came to the throne."
In the event of his death prior to that time, the
Shah has planned ahead.
We have provisions that the Empress will be regent
until the Crown Prince (Reza, 13) comes of age when he
is 20. She will rule with the help of a council. That
is voted, accepted. It is legal. But I also have my
political will (which has been) written, signed and sent
to the people (in order to) try to keep what permitted
us to be what we are - that is, to continue along our
present course until the country is really developed and
illiteracy does not exist any more. 181
It can be assumed that either a relative, such
as Empress Farah or brother-in-law General Toufanian, or
another high-ranking member of the ruling elite will carry
out the Shah's "political will" if the succession is an
orderly one.
Given the possibility of a violent threat to
his life and a radical threat to the government, the Shah
has obviously made plans to ward off a succession crisis in
Iran.
18 Oakes, J.B., "Shah is Offering New Plan to Aid
Developing Nations," The New York Times , 24 September 1975,
P- 1
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For roughly 150 years (prior to 1971) , stability in
the Persian Gulf area was provided by the power of the British
government, and in particular by units of the Royal Navy. In
1968 the British announced their intention to withdraw from
the Gulf by 1971. The consensus of opinion was that the re-
sulting power vacuum would attract super-power involvement
in the area.
Although most of the Gulf states disliked this probable
outcome/ few if any were prepared to take over Britain's former
duties. There likewise appeared little likelihood for their
establishing a collective security organization.
Iran, with the largest population, the largest armed
forces, and one of the most stable governments in the Gulf,
took the lead in filling Britain's former role.
The other Gulf states benefit from the stability
provided by the Shah's forces, desiring like Iran the freedom
from big-power involvement in local matters. These other
states have not really protested Iran's military initiatives.
Being Arab states, however, they have been cautious and watch-
ful of the non-Arab Iran.
Iran's policy of protecting the Persian Gulf actually
predates the 1968 British announcement of withdrawal. The
Shah saw the British withdrawal from Aden in 1965 as a pre-
cursor of later developments. The lack of action by CENTO
in the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 also warned the Shah that
while the U.S. might assist Iran in a direct confrontation
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with the Soviet Union, the U.S. couldn't be relied upon in
strictly local affairs.
The U.S. denial to let Iran transfer arms to Pakistan
in 1965 during the war with India may be regarded as a mile-
stone in Iran's determination to follow a course of indepen-
dence. Thereafter Iran sought the capability to effect its
own policy for stability in the Persian Gulf.
In the Fall of 1965 the Majles passed a $400 million
arms bill to build a navy literally from scratch. They pur-
chased British destroyers and hovercraft, and built a major
naval base at Bandar Abbas.
Within a few short years Iran made arms acquisitions
to improve all of its armed services (F-4's in 1968, Rapier
SAM's in 1970, and Chieftan tanks by 1971).
In 1966 Iran also concluded an arms deal for $110
million with the Soviet Union - another "clear gesture of
182independence." Iran then shifted a major army unit, the
Headquarters 2nd Army Corps, from the Soviet border to Tehran,
and established the 3rd Army Corps at Shiraz near the Gulf.
All of these actions indicated Iran's increased interest in
security in the Persian Gulf and Iran's ability to deal with
it unilaterally.
In 1971 Iran conducted a large-scale tri-service
Iranian military exercise in the Gulf, previewing the later
occupation of force of the Tumb Islands near the Straits of
182SIPRI, The Arms Trade, p. 378
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Hormuz in late November. These occupations on the eve of
the British withdrawal were clear indicators of Iran's
security interests in the Persian Gulf. Other Gulf states'
reactions, while hostile, were short-lived.
Iran has demonstrated a continuing interest in Gulf
stability through its actions in Oman. The Shah took an
early lead when other states failed to aid the Sultan of
Oman in putting down the Dhofar rebels. The Shah sent sub-
stantial forces (helicopters, F-5's, radar units, 4,500 men)
to put down the rebellion.
Although a victory was declared in late 1975, Iranian
units have only recently (January 1977) been reported as
18 3
returning home. Even these units were reported as being
ready to return if necessary.
Since the mid-1960 's Iran has shown a strong interest
in the stability of the Persian Gulf. Iran considers the
Gulf and its sea lanes vital to Iran's economic livelihood.
Continuance of the status quo in the riparian states also
impinges on Iran's political well-being. The Shah is willing
to insure Gulf stability independent of outside assistance.
3. Iran and Indian Ocean Stability
Iran's desire for stability and security does not
stop at the Straits of Hormuz, as Alvin Cotrell notes.
In various conversations with this author, the Shah has
consistently and forcefully elaborated his view that
Iran's vital interest in maintaining her shipments of
oil to the rest of the world did not stop at the Straits
18 3Tehran Journal, 27 January 1977
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of Hormuz . He is skeptical of the willingness and ability
of the larger powers to protect these sea lines of com-
munication. 184
While not being able to provide security for entire
voyages, Iran has stated that it will assume a responsibility
for some degree of maritime security in the vaguely-defined
area of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Iran's Indian Ocean security goals include military
as well as political/economic initiatives. From a strictly
military perspective Iran desires to patrol and show the flag
in the northern Indian Ocean and the approaches to the Persian
Gulf. An appreciation for military sea power was voiced by
Vice-Admiral Abbas Ramzi Atai, Commander of the Iranian
Imperial Navy, declaring that
Iran's naval forces would not allow instability and dis-
order to erupt ' in any spot in Iranian waters and the
seas bound up with our national interests.' He warned
that Iran ' . . .was fully prepared to carry out orders at
any moment and place throughout the Persian Gulf, the
Sea of Oman, and the northern Indian Ocean. '185
Iran's orders for at least six P-3F ASW aircraft,
four Spruance-class destroyers, and three Tang-class sub-
marines point to probable operations in the Indian Ocean
versus strictly local operations in the Persian Gulf. In
fact the I.I.N, has already conducted routine operations in
the Indian Ocean, joint ASW operations with Pakistan, and
Cottrell, A.J., "The Foreign Policy of the Shah,"
Strategic Review
, Fall 1975, p. 7.
185Kayham (International Edition), 9 November 1974.
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multilateral CENTO Mid-Link exercises. In January 1977 three
I.I.N, units cruised to Bombay, India.
Iran's limited blue-water naval and maritime air
operations have caused India some alarm.
...disquieting to New Delhi is the thrust Iran is making
into the Indian Ocean as a credible naval power...
The Shah's ambition to make Iran an Indian Ocean power
impinges on India's own security . "°
There is also the remote possibility that Iran and
India would cooperate, along with other littoral states, to
maintain collective naval security in the Indian Ocean'without
the interference of the superpowers.
The Shah sees usefulness in the U.S. presence on
Bahrain and Diego Garcia only as long as the Soviets are
also present in the area.
I am not opposing the Diego Garcia base as long as there
are other powers in the Indian Ocean. That would be silly.
I have no positive figures but some people say that the
Russians have 9,000 shipdays present in the Indian Ocean.
(In that case) how could we tell the Americans to keep
away? But we could ask them, both of them, to keep away
from the Indian Ocean simultaneously . 187
In conclusion it is not easy to separate Iran's
altruistic goals of policing the Indian Ocean in the interest
of a zone of peace from more self-oriented goals of establish-
ing Iranian hegemony in the area.
I o c.
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4. Diplomatic and Economic Initiatives
Iran has taken diplomatic and economic measures to
counter the Soviet influence that surrounds Iran on three
sides.
Iran's signing of the Algiers Agreement in March
1975 was a surprise diplomatic move which virtually ended
Iran's problems with Iraq. This action has been complemented
by improved relations between Iran and the Arab states, Saudi
Arabia and Egypt.
Iran has supported Pakistan in an effort to maintain
stability on the Eastern front. The help provided to Pakistan
during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India was deeply appre-
ciated by President Bhutto who said,
that when Pakistan's airfields were exposed to Indian
raids, the Pakistan Air Force had taken shelter in Iran
and had flown supply missions from there. When Kharachi
Port was blockaded, Tehran had provided an overland route
through Zahidan.
Iran had also helped with maritime reconnaissance,
provided a fully equipped military hospital, and experts
to fight the fires in oil tanks in Karachi after a missile
attack by the Indian Navy. 188
Iran has provided Pakistan with economic aid and has virtually
guaranteed the prevention of any further dismemberment of
that country, either by outside wars or internal secessionist
movements
.
To allay Indian fears regarding Pakistan, Iran also
offered oil credit to India, as well as Afghanistan, in late
1973 after the price increases and the energy crisis.
188
Peiris, op. cit
. , p. 16
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Oil-dependent India now receives approximately 65% of its
oil from Iran.
Iran has also made diplomatic efforts to allay India's
fear of Iran's recent arms acquisitions. In reciprocal visits
in 1974 (Tehran in May, New Delhi in October) , the Shah and
Prime Minister Gandhi agreed on Iranian oil deliveries and
economic aid to India. In return India would supply trained
manpower to Iran.
The talks also dealt with the India-Iraq and the
Iran-Pakistan relationships. Both parties reaffirmed their
support for the Indian Ocean as a "Zone of Peace." The talks
18 9
resulted in "very close and friendly relations."
Iran may also have made a distinct attempt to lessen
Soviet influence in India by cementing friendly relations
with Mrs. Gandhi.
Iran's diplomatic and economic relations with both
India and Pakistan may even promote greater stability on
the subcontinent than either the United States or the Soviet
Union has been able to achieve.
Conceivably, in trying to develop closer relations
with both India and Pakistan, Teheran might succeed in
improving relations with Delhi and Islamabad simultan-
eously. Moreover, Teheran's favors, so badly needed by
both countries, might be so measured out to each as to
induce closer cooperation between them. Because Washington
and Moscow tried and failed is no guarantee that the Shah
cannot be successful. 190
189Weinraub, B., "Iran and India Say Links Are Growing,"
The New York Times , 5 October 1974, p. 7.
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Another little-noticed effort at Indian Ocean stability
was Iran's diplomatic initiatives with China. The Chinese in-
fluence in the littoral states has been small and low-keyed.
Of most direct concern to Iran was the Chinese support to the
Dhofar rebels in Oman. Iran was able to remove this support
through recognition of the P.R.C. in September 1971 and by a
visit to China of Empress Farah in 1972. Iran's recognition
of China may be seen as an attempt to balance Soviet in-
fluence in the Indian Ocean area.
5. Conclusion
In reviewing Iranian and U.S. perspectives on stability
in the Persian Gulf area, several major points stand out.
Iran perceives its massive internal development programs as
critical to its future. These programs have required large
social changes which have been resisted by a number of in-
ternal elements. Certain authoritarian measures have been
employed to quiet this opposition. Human rights advocates
in the U.S. have urged the application of arms sanctions
against Iran until the internal situation improves.
The Shah has rejected criticism of his human rights
stance, noting that Iran is a sovereign country and that he
will do what he feels is necessary to achieve discipline.
The Shah has also laid plans for an orderly succession should
his opponents succeed in removing him.
Having secured itself internally, Iran has sought
to insure stability in the surrounding area. Its measures
to do so have included selective military actions, as well
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as diplomatic and economic initiatives to enhance its position
in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region.
Iran's rise to power has partially filled the vacuum
left by the British withdrawal. This increase in power has
been possible through Iran's increased economic power to
purchase larger air, land and naval forces. The presence
of these forces and the improvements in Iran's diplomatic
interactions have been instrumental in regaining a measure





A. REASONS FOR ARMS DEMAND
1. New Roles for Iran
The increase in arms sales from the U.S. to Iran in
the late 1960 f s and in the 1970 's was due in part to Iran's
changing roles and relationships. The lack of CENTO support
for Pakistan in 1965, the British military withdrawal from
the Persian Gulf (1968-1971) , the lack of a U.S. or Western
replacement for the British force, the influx of a Soviet
presence in the area, and the accelerated economic importance
of oil following the OPEC actions of 1973 caused major changes
in Iran's previous relationships.
These changes indicated to Iran that it alone must be
more responsible for its own defense and security interests.
Iran came to appreciate its position as a significant regional
power and as a potential world power of the second rank, i.e.,
equal to a European power such as West Germany. This new
appreciation was coupled with a demand for the trappings of
a modern state, including modern arms as well as industrial
development and social programs.
Concomitant with Iran's appreciation in stature has
been a relative depreciation in the role of the U.S. as a
guarantor of regional security interests. The so-called
"Nixon Doctrine" sought to replace the security formerly
obtained through overseas troop and treaty commitments with
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increased arms sales so that friendly countries might provide
for their own security.
2. Threat Rationale
External threats are routinely paraded as part of the
justification for Iranian arms purchases. Close inspection
shows, however, that the actual present threats to Iran are
now at a nearly all-time low. The resolution of differences
between Iran and Iraq in March 1975 greatly reduced major
tension with Iran's foremost rival.
A successful end to the fighting in Oman's Dhofar
Province in December 1976 ended another major potentially
destabilizing incident.
Iran has made concerted efforts to maintain good
relations with her Gulf neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Iran has also sought to improve relations with Egypt, Pak-
istan, India, and China. Her relations with the U.S.S.R.,
Iran's long-time threat from the north, are at least good.
Even so, a large number of potential threats still
exist. Iran at times considers itself almost an outsider
among a host of Arab neighbors. On another level the Shah
pictures Iran as surrounded by a bevy of communist-influenced
states, by the Soviet Union itself, and by a new and expanding
Soviet naval presence in the northern Indian Ocean.
Iran seeks at least a credible deterrent force to
counter these potential threats. Iran's desire for modern
arms also reflects the country's dependency on oil revenues
and Iran's desire for the means to protect its vital natural
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resources. The Shah then rejects any outside evaluation of
Iran's security requirements as paternalistic meddling.
3. Filling A Power Vacuum
Iran's demands for arms was also affected by the low
military posture from which Iran started. Iran along with
most other Persian Gulf states long relied on the British
military to provide stability "east of Suez." With the reali-
zation that this era was ending and that a regional alliance
was not really operable, Iran felt obligated to provide for
its own security.
The jump from a "palace guard" army to a modern,
well-rounded multi-role force explains much of the increase
in military sales to Iran.
The arms build-up in the Persian Gulf has been por-
trayed as an arms race. Iran's rivalry with Soviet-backed
Iraq fits this description better than does Iran's relation-
ship with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have sought an independent
security capability rather than a weapon- for-weapon race with
Iran.
More importantly the current level of arms acquisitions
in both countries shows how much cheaper was the previous
stability provided by the physical and psychological presence
of British military and naval forces. The stability which
might have resulted from a continuance of the British forces




4. A Lightning War
A final major factor affecting the current demand
for arms in the Persian Gulf is the "lessons learned" from
the October 1973 War. Past patterns have shown that a
country's arms acquisitions usually increase after the end
of a war. Weapons and tactics have been through "live-fire"
testing and countries readjust their inventories according
to their new evaluations.
Some of the lessons learned from the most recent Arab-
Israeli conflict apply to Iran. The quick nature of desert
warfare, the high attrition of equipment, the requirement for
mobile SAM protection, the need for troop mobility, new uses
of tanks and anti-tank weapons, and the importance of elec-
tronic countermeasures and command-and-control systems are
a few of the examples.
Iran has noted particularly the dependency of Israel
on U.S. arms resupply efforts. The short nature of past
Middle East wars and the high attrition of equipment have
increased Iran's desire to have as high an inventory of equip-
ment as it can reasonably afford. The difficult question of
"how much is enough" is complicated by the penalites for
being caught short.
B. REASONS FOR ARMS SUPPLY
1. Economic Reasons
A major factor influencing U.S. supply of arms to
Iran has been the economic benefits. Although this topic
is usually listed at the end of any official pronouncements,
its impact is significant.
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The recent upsurge in U.S. arms sales to Iran has
had an appreciable effect in offsetting Iran's increased
oil prices. Iran's arms purchases have also had a profound
effect on lengthening production runs of major U.S. weapons
systems. In addition to lowering the unit costs from the
production end, Iran has subsidized research and development
costs at the start-up end of U.S. weapons procurements. Iran's
arms orders also provide a substantial source of employment
in the U.S.
Iran has also affected U.S. procurement decisions.
Through loans to U.S. manufacturers, early announcements of
commitments, and funding for research and development, Iran
may have provided the impetus at the critical time when a
"go/no-go" decision was being made.
U.S. arms manufacturers and U.S. service branch rep-
resentatives have been accused of stimulating Iranian demand
for U.S. arms through high-pressure salesmanship. In spite
of these charges of arms peddling, there remains the fact
that U.S. arms were bought in many cases because they were
good. U.S. arms are the products of a highly sophisticated
technological base. They have been proven in combat (Vietnam
and Arab-Israeli wars) , and they have the best reputation in
the world for follow-on support.
A final economic benefit from U.S. arms sales to Iran
has been the spin-off demands for non-arms civilian sales.
As the U.S. involvement and reputation in Iran has increased,




A recent trade agreement signed in Tehran by Secre-
tary Kissinger promised $40 billion in non-arms trade between
the U.S. and Iran over the next five years. The $40 billion
exceeds the arms sales agreement of $10-15 billion over the
same period of time.
2. Influence
Arms sales theoretically buy the supplier nation
influence and good relations with the recipient. It appears
that arms sales are an integral part of diplomacy. It is
extremely difficult to be friendly with another country while
prohibiting or severely restricting arms sales, particularly
if that country is dependent on outside suppliers.
U.S. influence in Iran is best defined in terms of
the transfer of U.S. intellectual, cultural, scientific, and
military values to Iran through the expanding presence of
Americans "in-country." U.S. influence in Iran's foreign
and domestic policy-making through the arms supply system is,
however, highly constrained and limited. In addition to
having limited effect on Iran's independent course of action,
a restrictive U.S. arms sales policy toward Iran would probably
result in hostile reaction from the Shah.
3. Security Interests
The other major U.S. rationale for arms sales to Iran
is the national security interests of the United States. The
U.S. is not prepared to bolster Persian Gulf stability with
more than the token force already in Bahrain - the U. S.
Middle East Force. The U.S. does, however, have a high interest
in the area and an increasing dependency on its oil.
116

Consequently the U.S. has sought to arm local friendly forces




The largest problem area in U.S. -Iranian arms trans-
fers is interdependency. The U.S. has become the main supplier
to Iran of aircraft and radar systems, and has supplied Iran
with a significant proportion of its other military hardware.
These sales usually call for follow-on set-up, check-out,
maintenance, training, and parts services. Even if U.S.
deliveries of new equipment were halted now, the follow-on
services for the equipment already delivered might continue
for 10-15 years.
This entanglement of U.S. support personnel was
evidently foreseen, if not planned, by the Shah as an un-
written security commitment from the U.S. The U.S. has a
contractual, if not a moral, obligation to support Iran's
equipment or risk loss of confidence from other current and
potential allies and arms customers. It is also conceivable
that continued U.S. access to Iranian oil is dependent on
continued U.S. arms sales to the Shah.
While there is general agreement that U.S. goals are
very similar to those of Iran now, the future leaves room
for doubt. While the U.S. may now willingly sell Iran arms
to deter its potential enemies, to secure the Persian Gulf
as an oil source, to help fill the power vacuum in the Indian
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Ocean, and to bolster U.S. defense industries and earn
balance-of-payment offsets; some future results may not be
acceptable.
The military dependency of Iran on the U.S., partic-
ularly in the case of the Iranian air force, is disturbing.
One wonders whether U.S. planners also foresaw the implications
of large sales commitments to the Iranian armed forces. One
would hope that in the future the U.S. would conduct an arms
sales policy in line with the nation's best interests and
free of implied commitments.
2. Hostage Americans
The problem of hostage Americans involves the esti-
mated 30,000 Americans in Iran. While only a fraction of
them are actually connected with the arms deliveries (most
are civilian contractors or dependents) , they present the
U.S. with a large problem should Iran be drawn into an armed
conflict. The U.S. would automatically be drawn into that
conflict in order to protect a large number of U.S. citizens.
By the same token, of course, the American presence might
also have a deterrent effect on Iran's enemy. In either case
the Americans in Iran would become, in one sense or another,
hostages.
Also of increasing concern is the problem not of
hostage, but of "ugly" Americans in Iran. The opportunities
for cross-cultural friction have evidently increased propor-
191tionately with the number of Americans in the country.
191Cooley, J.K.,"U.S. Civilian Role In Iran 'Defense'




Iran has occasionally bought Soviet or West European
weapons to signal its displeasure with the size or the modernity
of U.S. arms transfers. In nearly all cases the U.S. responded
by liberalizing its offering on the contention that the U.S.
must sell arms to prevent the Soviets from gaining a foothold
in Iran. Given the nature of the country, the past remarks
of its leader, and Iran's long opposition to Soviet influence
and communism; this prospect seems remote. There appears
to be little likelihood that Iran is easily open to Soviet
penetration.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
Present U.S. policy of case-by-case evaluation of arms
sales within the framework of current laws, while not perfect,
appears to be a reasonably effective method of handling a
difficult issue. In the case of Iran, however, the evaluation
process was completely bypassed by Executive fiat at a critical
time period. This action opened the gates to arms sales that
went "out of control" and left the U.S. with an almost irre-
versible commitment to Iran.
The long-term contracts and commitments have created an
Iranian dependency on the U.S. that is not ideal; but rather
than completely restructuring the arms sales process, it would
be beneficial to examine the present process in cases where
it was not overridden and was allowed to function. It is
unlikely that additional laws would provide a better arms
sales policy than the case-by-case discussion, review, and
evaluation called for by present laws.
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The outspoken personality of the Shah and the sensational
publicity afforded his arms purchases will probably elicit
increasingly restrictive U.S. arms sales policies anyway.
One possibly beneficial amendment that was dropped from the
Arms Export and Control Act of 1976 was the $9 billion ceiling
on total foreign arms sales. Such a ceiling might have the
beneficial effect of promoting more open discussion of arms
sales to various countries. Proponents of each country
would essentially be competing for a variably-sized portion
of the fixed amount.
When total sales requests surpassed the ceiling, the less
worthy would be rejected or all the requests would be cut
back by some degree. If such a ceiling would promote dis-
cussions and open debate on U.S. interests in selling arms
to countries such as Iran, the proposal would be of much
merit.
Any U.S. arms sales curtailment is likely to elicit strong
objections from the Shah. It is unlikely that he would em-
bargo oil to the U.S., because Iran depends too heavily on
oil revenues for him to do so. A more likely response would
be to reduce purchases of non-military U.S. goods and services,
The U.S. arms sales problem may, however, be on its way
to solving itself. The sensationalism of the hugh dollar
amounts of arms sales to Iran is on the wane, and the Iranians
themselves have announced some cutbacks in defense spending
192
as a result of decreased oil revenues.
192Cumming-Bruce , N. , "Fluctuations in Oil Market Upset
Budget Estimates," Middle East Economic Digest , 11 Mar 1974, p. 4
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Iran's heavy dependency on U.S. arms may also be fading,
General Toufanian's recent arms shopping trip to the Soviet
Union, and Iran's consideration of the French Mirage 2000
instead of the U.S. F-18L to replace the F-4 are signals of
the new trend.
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Preamble and Selected Articles of U.S. -Iranian Treaty of
Friendship and Commerce, signed 13 December 1856, Effective
19413 June 1857: **
In the name of God the Element and the Merciful.
The President of the United States of North America,
and his Majesty as exalted as the Planet Saturn; the
Sovereign to whom the Sun serves as a standard; whose
splendor and magnificence are equal to that of 'the Skies;
the Sublime Sovereign, the Monarch whose armies are as
numerous as the Stars; whose greatness calls to mind
that of Jeinshid; whose magnificance equals that of
Darius; the Heir of the Crown and Throne of the Kayanians;
the Sublime Emperor of all Persia, being both equally
and sincerely desirous of establishing relations of
Friendship between the two Governments , which they wish
to strengthen by a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce,
reciprocally advantageous and useful to the Citizens
and subjects of the two High contracting parties, have
for this purpose named for their Plenipotentiaries,
The President of the United States of North America,
Carroll Spence, Minister Resident of the United States
near the Sublime Porte; and His Majesty the Emperor of
all Persia, His Excellency Emin ul Molk Farrukh Khan,
Ambassador of His Imperial Majesty the Shah, decorated
with the portrait of the Shah, with the great cordon blue
and bearer of the girdle of diamonds, &c, &c, &c , &c.
And the said Plenipotentiaries having exchanged their
full powers, which were found to be in proper and due
form, have agreed upon the following articles.
Article I
There shall be hereafter a sincere and constant good
understanding between the Government and citizens of the
United States of North America and the Persian Empire
and all Persian subjects.
194Bevans, C.I., Treaties and Other International Agree-
ments of the United States of America, 1776-1949 , vol. 8,




The Ambassadors or Diplomatic agents, whom it may
please either of the two high contracting parties to
send and maintain near the other, shall be received and
treated, they and all those composing their Missions,
as the Ambassadors and Diplomatic agents of the most
favored nations are received and treated in the two
respective countries; and they shall enjoy there, in all




SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION PACT: 195
Art. 1. Consistent with Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter,
The parties will co-operate for their security and
defense. Such measures as they agree to take to give
effect to this co-operation may form the subject of
special agreements with each other.
Art. 3. The parties undertake to refrain from any
interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs.
They will settle any disputes between themselves in a
peaceful way in accordance with the U.N. Charter.
Art. 5. This pact shall be open for accession to
any member-State of the Arab League or any other State
actively concerned with the security and peace in this
region and which is fully recognized by both of the
parties. Accession shall come into force from the date
on which the instrument of accession of the State con-
cerned is deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Iraq. Any acceding State... may conclude special
agreements, in accordance with Art. 1, with one or more
States parties to the present pact.
Art. 7. This pact remains in force for a period of
five years, renewable for further five-year periods.
Any contracting party may withdraw from the pact by
notifying the other parties in writing of its desire
to do so six months before the expiration of any of the
above-mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains
valid for the other parties.






ARTICLES OF THE U.S. -IRANIAN BILATERAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT OF
5 MARCH 1959. 196
Art. 1. The Government of Iran is determined to
resist aggression. In case of aggression against Iran,
the U.S. Government, in accordance with the U.S. Consti-
tution/ will take such appropriate action, including
the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon
and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote
Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to
assist the Government of Iran at its request.
Art. 2. The U.S. Government, in accordance with the
Mutual Security Act of 19 54, as amended, and related laws
of the U.S.A., and with applicable agreements heretofore
or hereafter entered into between the U.S. and Iranian
Governments, reaffirms that it will continue to furnish
the Government of Iran such military and economic assis-
tance as may be mutually agreed upon between the U.S.
and Iranian Governments, in order to assist the Govern-
ment of Iran in the preservation of its national in-
dependence and integrity and in the effective promotion
. of its economic development.
Art. 3. The Government of Iran undertakes to utilize
such military and economic assistance as may be provided
by the U.S. Government in a manner consonant with the
aims and purposes set forth by the Governments associated
in the declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, and
for the purpose of effectively promoting the economic
development of Iran and of preserving her national in-
dependence and integrity.
Art. 4. The U.S. and Iranian Governments will co-
operate with the other Governments associated in the
declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, in order
to prepare and participate in such defensive arrangements
as may be mutually agreed to be desirable, subject to
the other applicable provisions of this agreement.
Art. 5. The provisions of the present agreement do
not affect the co-operation between the two Governments
as envisaged in other international agreements or
arrangements
.
Art. 6. This agreement shall enter into force upon
the date of its signature and shall continue in force
until one year after the receipt by either Government
of written notice of the intention of the other Govern-








EXTRACTS FROM THE TEXT OF THE IRAQI-IRANIAN JOINT COMMUNIQUE
(ON SHATT AL-ARAB 7 MARCH 1975). 197
In application of the principles of the territorial
integrity of soil and borders and of non-interference in
internal affairs, the two high-level contracting sides
have decided on the following: (1) To make a final de-
marcation of their land borders in accordance with the
Constantinople protocol of 1913 and the minutes of the
committee for the demarcation of borders for 1914; (2)
to define their maritime borders in accordance with the
Thalweg line; (3) to restore, in accordance with the above,
security and mutual confidence along their joint borders.
The two sides, consequently, will maintain strict and
effective control over their joint borders in order to
put a final end to all subversive infiltration from
either side; (4) the two sides have agreed to regard the
foregoing arrangements as inseparable elements of a
comprehensive solution. Consequently, any violation of
the contents of these provisions will naturally contradict
the spirit of the Algiers agreement.
The two sides will remain in constant touch with
President Houari Boumedienne who, when necessary, will
offer the fraternal assistance of Algeria in the appli-
cation of these decisions. The two sides have decided
to restore the traditional ties of good neighbourliness
and friendship, particularly by eliminating all the
negative factors in their relations through the constant
exchange of views on questions of joint interest and the
development of mutual co-operation. The two sides offic-
ially announce that the area should be safe from any
foreign intervention.
The Foreign Ministers of Iraq and Iran will meet on
15 March 1975 in Tehran in the presence of the Algerian
Foreign Minister to draw up the arrangements for the work
of the Iranian-Iraqi mixed committee which has been
established for the purpose of implementing the decisions
adopted in the joint agreement noted above. In accordance
with the desire of the two sides, Algeria will be invited
to attend the meetings of the Iranian-Iraqi mixed com-
mittee. The mixed committee will define its agenda and
methods of work in order to meet, if necessary, alter-
nately in Baghdad and Tehran.
His Majesty the Shah of Iran has accepted with
pleasure the invitation extended to him by His Excellency
President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr to pay an official visit
197
"Extracts From the Text of the Iraqi-Iranian Joint
Communique," Middle East Economic Digest , 14 March 1975, p. 19.
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to Iraq. The date of this visit will be fixed by joint
agreement. Saddam Hussain has also agreed to pay an





ORDER OF BATTLE: IRAN. 198
Population: 33,810,000
Armed Forces: 300,000 (0.88% of population)
GNP (1975): 56.8 billion
Defense Expenditures: $9.5 billion ('76-' 77) (16.7% of GNP)





































75mm, 105mm, 130mm, 155mm, 175mm,
203mm
23mm, 35mm, 40mm, 57mm, 85mm
Dragon (FGM-11A) U.S.
Entac (MGM-32) France






2 batteries Rapier (ET-316)
25 systems Tigercat
45 Cessna 185 U.S.
6 Cessna 310 U.S.
10 Cessna 0-2A U.S.
U.K.
U.K.
19 8OOB for Iran was drawn from the following sources
:
Defense Foreign Affairs Handbook, 1976-77
, p. 220, Copley,
1976; "Middle East Defense," Flight International , 19 June
1976, p. 1654; Foreign Military Markets , "Iran Summary,"
Defense Marketing Service, 1976.
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(helo) 170 AH-1J Cobra U.S
150 Bell 214A u.s




1540 Chieftan tanks U.K.
35 Scorpion It. tank U.K.
BMP-1 APC U.S.S.R.
358 M-113 APC U.S.
Fox scout car U.K.
— Dragon anti-tank msl U.K.
12,667 TOW anti-tank msl U.S.
ZSU-23/4 AAA U.S.S.R.




32 AH-1J Cobra U.S.
137 Bell 214A U.S.
400 Bell 214A co-produce
MAZ tank transports U.S.S.R.
NAVY
SHIPS
18,500 personnel (6.2% of armed forces)
3 Destroyers, SAM equipped U.S.
4 Frigates SAM and SSM equipped U.K



































FPBG La Combattante, Exocet SSM France
Landing Craft U.S.
S-5A U.S.
ex-U.S. Tang-class diesel submarines
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Surface-to-surface Missiles on order




500 SS-12, AS-12 France






















Tankers 12 B-707-320C (KC-135)

























































AIR FORCE, ON ORDER









39 Bell 214C helo




Air-to-air missiles on order range
Falcon AIM-4 6nm






Air-to-surface missiles on order




ORDER OF BATTLE: IRAQ 1"
Population: 11,490,000
Armed Forces: 158,000 (1.4% of population)
GNP: $13,400,000,000 (1975) I
Defense Expenditures: $1,191,000,000 (8.8% of GNP, 1975-1976)


























— 120mm, 160mm mortars
AAA: 800 23mm, 37mm, 57mm, 10mm guns
SAMS: SA-2, SA-3, SA-7
SSM: FROG: SS-1C SCUD-B
Navy 3,000 Personnel (1.9% of armed forces)
3 S.O.-l Sub Chasers
6 OSA-I PTFG SSN-2 Styx
4 OSA-II PTFG SSN-2 Styx
12 P-6 torpedo boat
2 T-43 MSF
20 small patrol boats
199Sources for the Iraqi OOB included the following:
"Iraq," Defense Foreign Affairs Handbook , 1976-1977, p. 224,
Copley, 1976; "Middle East Defense," Flight International
,
19 June 1976, p. 1655; "Iraq Survey," Foreign Military
Markets
, Defense Marketing Service, 1976.
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Air Force 15,000 personnel (9.5% of armed forces)











































































III + 20 on orde:r
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ORDER OF BATTLE: SAUDI ARABIA'
Population: 5,000,000 - 6,000,000
Armed Forces: 51,000 (0.85% of population)
GNP: $24.8 billion (1974)
Defense Expenditure: $6.7 billion (1975-1976)
Army : 40,000 active personnel
20,000 National Guard




















Artillery: 105mm, 75mm guns
SAM's: 60 Hawk launchers (10 batteries)
441 Hawk missiles 291 MIN-23B
105 MIN-23A





100 AMX-30 Light tanks
250 M-60 Medium tanks
250 Scorpion Light tanks
250 M-113 APC
120 V-150 Commando Armored Car
Sources for the Saudi Arabian OOB were as follows:
Defense Foreign Affairs Handbook , 1976-1977, p. 394, Copley,
1976; "Middle East Defense," Flight International , 19 June 76,
p. 1662; "Saudi Arabia Survey," Foreign Military Markets
,














Crotale (Shahine) mobile SAM











Coast Guard: 50 small patrol boats
8 SRN-6 hovercraft





















































1000 Maverick 650 on order
1250 Sidewinder on order
2000 TOW 1000 on order
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